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SCO's Redacted Reply Memo in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, as text |
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Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 01:07 AM EST
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I think this is the funniest sentence in any memorandum so far, from SCO's just filed redacted Reply Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of November 29, 2006:What is evident from IBM’s opposition is that it strongly prefers this case to be decided on a conglomeration of procedural issues rather than the merits of SCO’s case. Mwahahahahahahaha. I believe Freud would call that projection. Or in my simple mother tongue, it's the pot calling the kettle black. SCO's lawyers are nothing if not masters of the procedural tango. Nay, artistes! This very motion some might call evidence of the art. If, after they lose this motion, they find yet another way to whine about the court's sanction against them, I think they might just qualify for an award. We've been going around and around about this since June of 2006.
I'm sure IBM would have been delighted to learn the merits of SCO's case, had SCO been willing or able to express it with specificity by the deadline, as ordered by the court. Oh, *that* procedural issue, the one SCO keeps trying to nonchalantly hop over as if it didn't matter. "The merits of SCO's case"? What case? SCO's new argument is that it doesn't need new evidence or new law to justify the judge granting their motion to reconsider. I think we should call it a motion to re-reconsider, because Judge Kimball did a de novo review already once. No, that is not enough for SCO: the judge must reconsider to prevent manifest injustice. How could the court make a decision without all the experts' reports? What SCO seems to have forgotten is that the schedule always contemplated the end of fact discovery arriving prior to the deadline for the expert reports. Now it contends that the judge couldn't possibly reach a correct decision about whether SCO met the deadline for fact discovery, without waiting for the experts reports. But the unalterable bottom line is that SCO failed to provide what it was told to provide by the deadline, and the court didn't like it that SCO seemed to be holding back evidence and also a theory of the case, apparently in order to surprise IBM and thus gain an unfair advantage. So the "injustice" if SCO isn't permitted to sandbag IBM would be what? And shall we discuss the prejudice to IBM if SCO is permitted ignore deadlines at will and come up with new material after discovery is over? No. We're back in Wonderland, where up is down and it's off with IBM's head in SCO's happy dreams.
Another lovely touch. The only case SCO attaches as an exhibit is a ruling from a criminal case. It's a sign! Joke, joke. The essence of the ruling is that in the interests of "justice", the judge has discretion to do whatever he wants. If only. Here's an interesting revelation: SCO’s argument, as IBM well knows, is that the Dynix and AIX systems are derivative works of UNIX System V, protected as such by the license agreements. SCO is not claiming that the methods and concepts at issue are located in System V, but in a derivative – equally protected by the language of the license agreements. Now they tell us. Oh, no. SCO isn't sandbagging. Not a bit. They just forgot to mention this detail, I guess, until just now. The "methods and concepts" are from AIX and Dynix, don't you know. SCO isn't claiming IBM got them from System V! No, the high crime is that IBM wrote AIX itself and then donated its "methods and concepts" from its own AIX, and Dynix, to Linux. Can you beat that? In SCO's fantasies, the whole world of software belongs to SCO. SCO's is the head, the Medusa, from which spring all software thoughts, designs, and concepts. All your code base are belong to us.
There's another filing too, which I haven't read yet, but I'm sure it will be riveting and equally entertaining as this one, since it's about the GPL. That's my favorite topic. I daresay I'd rather hear SCO talk about the GPL than any other subject. I like the part about how SCO never breached or repudiated the GPL. They can write about that for days, and I never get bored. I see a header in that filing's table of contents I can't wait to read, particularly in light of the news that the methods and concepts aren't from System V. It reads, "Linux is a Derivative Work Based on SCO's Unix System V." Well, which is it? I know. *Everything* is a derivative work of SCO's Unix System V. They just can't show all the rungs on the ladder that leads to SCO heaven so as to convince the rest of us. They need more discovery. SCO begs for a few more depositions. They even offer to pay IBM's expenses. Then they could prove IBM is wrong, wrong, wrong. The court is too. Wrong, wrong, wrong. SCO tries to bully the judge: "The failure to grant a motion for reconsideration can constitute an abuse of discretion." SCO says if it can do more depositions, it can find new evidence. Hey, that's what they said they could find if they got all versions of AIX since the founding of the world. IBM summed it up like this, that SCO just won't take no for an answer. This is like the quest for the Holy Grail or Jason and the Argonauts' setting sail on the long and mythic journey to find the Golden Fleece. Except SCO never finds anything that anyone can understand or care about. Some of the arguments, and even the cases, are just silly. I like the name of one case they quote repeatedly, Gripe. Imagine if your last name were Gripe, and you were involved in litigation. It's at least SCO's middle name. But the case is not helpful to SCO, to my eyes. For one thing, it's a ruling where the court refused to overturn the lower court's sanction against an attorney that failed to follow the rules. SCO in this filing argues that the court must consider the Ehrenhaus factors: As shown in SCO's opening brief, the Tenth Circuit requires consideration of the "Ehrenhaus factors" on the record before a party's claims can be dismissed or limited. Gripe v. City of Enid... But look what the Gripe case said about that: Before imposing dismissal as a sanction, a district court should ordinarily evaluate the following factors on the record: "(1) the degree of actual prejudice to the [other party]; (2) the amount of interference with the judicial process; . . . (3) the culpability of the litigant; (4) whether the court warned the party in advance that dismissal of the action would be a likely sanction for noncompliance; and (5) the efficacy of lesser sanctions." Id. at 921 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (dismissing case as sanction for discovery violation). Although Ehrenhaus involved sanctions for discovery violations, we have held that "Rule 41(b) involuntary dismissals should be determined by reference to the Ehrenhaus criteria." Mobley v. McCormick, 40 F.3d 337, 341 (10th Cir. 1994). Similarly, we conclude that dismissal as a sanction under Rules 16(f) and 37(b)(2)(C) should ordinarily be evaluated under the same factors. See id. (finding "no principled distinction between sanctions imposed for discovery violations and sanctions imposed for noncompliance with other orders"). The factors do not create a rigid test but are simply criteria for the court to consider. Ehrenhaus, 965 F.2d at 921.
This isn't the first time I've wondered if SCO even reads the cases it cites or if it just reads the Westlaw headers. Somehow their heart doesn't seem to be in it.
Here's the Pacer info:
954 -
Filed & Entered:
02/02/2007
Redacted Document
Docket Text: REDACTION to [862] Sealed Document SCO's Memorandum in Opposition to IBM's Motion for Summary Judgment on Its Claim for Copyright Infringement (IBM's Eighth Counterclaim) by Plaintiff SCO Group, Counter Defendant SCO Group. (Attachments: # (1)Appendix A)(Normand, Edward)
955 -
Filed & Entered:
02/02/2007
Reply Memorandum/Reply to Response to Motion
Docket Text: REPLY to Response to Motion re [894] SEALED MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION filed by Plaintiff SCO Group, Counter Defendant SCO Group. (Attachments: # (1) Exhibit A)(James, Mark)
*****************************
Brent O. Hatch (5715)
Mark F. James (5295)
HATCH, JAMES & DODGE
[address, phone, fax]
Stuart H. Singer (admitted pro hac vice)
BOIES, SCHILLER & FLEXNER LLP
[address, phone, fax]
Robert Silver (admitted pro hac vice)
Edward Normand (admitted pro hac vice)
BOIES, SCHILLER & FLEXNER LLP
[address, phone, fax]
Stephen N. Zack (admitted pro hac vice)
BOIES, SCHILLER & FLEXNER LLP
[address, phone, fax]
Attorneys for The SCO Group, Inc.
____________________________________
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
___________________________________
THE SCO GROUP, INC.
Plaintiff/Counterclaim-Defendant,
v.
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
MACHINES CORPORATION,
Defendant/Counterclaim-Plaintiff.
_________________________________
SCO'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF THE
COURT'S ORDER OF NOVEMBER 29,
2006
Case No. 2:03CV0294DAK
Honorable Dale A. Kimball
Magistrate Judge Brooke C. Wells
SCO submits that reconsideration of this Court's November 29, 2006 Order ("November
Order") affirming the Magistrate Court's June 28, 2006 Order ("June Order") will prevent
manifest injustice and allow the Court to consider new evidence that was not previously
available. What is evident from IBM's opposition is that it strongly prefers this case to be
decided on a conglomeration of procedural issues rather than the merits of SCO's case. IBM's
opposition devotes little attention to the merits of that request and instead contends that this
Court cannot reconsider its order for procedural reasons. SCO shows below that this Court
clearly can and should exercise the discretion to reconsider its order on the grounds presented by
SCO and to grant the relief requested.
SCO has moved for reconsideration on three independent grounds. SCO respectfully
requests that the Court:
(1) vacate or stay the November Order to permit full consideration of the parties' expert
reports, which were not available at the time IBM's motion was heard and were not
considered, and which will clarify the nature of SCO's stricken items and IBM's
defenses;
(2) vacate or stay the November Order to permit consideration of testimony from the four
limited programmer depositions requested in SCO's opening brief, which was not
previously available, and would demonstrate conclusively the false predicates on
which IBM's motion was based; and/or
(3) at a minimum, vacate the November Order as it applies to the ten discrete stricken
items set forth in SCO's opening brief, because the rationale for the Magistrate
Court's June Order is plainly inapplicable to these items.
For the reasons set forth in SCO's initial brief and herein, reconsideration on these grounds will
demonstrate that the November Order was clearly in error and creates a manifest injustice to
SCO.
2
As shown in SCO's opening brief, the Tenth Circuit requires consideration of the
"Ehrenhaus factors" on the record before a party's claims can be dismissed or limited. Gripe v.
City of Enid, 312 F.3d 1184, 1187 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoted in Procter & Gamble Co. v. Haugen,
427 F.3d 727, 738 (10th Cir. 2005). The Court must consider the actual prejudice to IBM and
the culpability of SCO. The reconsideration sought by SCO goes directly to these factors. IBM
has not disputed that the Ehrenhaus factors had to be considered.
I. The Court Should Exercise Its Discretion to Reconsider Its November Order.
A district court has the discretion to reconsider any "order short of a final decree." Price
v. Philpot, 420 F.3d 1158, 1167 n.9 (10th Cir. 2005). The consideration of the merits of a
motion for reconsideration is squarely within that discretion. United States v. Maxfield, No.
04cr00149, 2007 WL 121128 (D. Utah Jan. 11, 2007) (citing Hancock v. City of Oklahoma City,
857 F.2d 1394, 1395 (10th Cir. 1988)(Ex. A)). The failure to grant a motion for reconsideration
can constitute an abuse of discretion. See Hancock, 857 F.2d 1394 at 1395.
IBM's cases acknowledge the foregoing discretion on the part of the district court. See,
e.g., Belmont v. Assocs. Nat'l Bank, 219 F. Supp. 2d 340, 342-43 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (recognizing
that the "decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is within the sound discretion of
the district court" and that a motion to reconsider permits the court the "opportunity to correct
manifest errors of law"); see also Phelps v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 1309, 1324 (10th Cir. 1997)
(reviewing district court's denial of motion for reconsideration under an abuse of discretion
standard); Webber v. Mefford, 43 F.3d 1340, 1345 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that district court's
denial of motion for reconsideration was not an abuse of discretion, where the district court
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considered on the merits an offer of proof for new evidence submitted by the plaintiff, and
concluded that the new evidence would not have changed the decision).
IBM focuses on the issue of new evidence, but motions to reconsider may be granted to
correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice even in the absence of any change in law or new
evidence. See Mantle Ranches, Inc. v. U.S. Park Serv., 950 F. Supp. 299, 300, 302 (D. Colo.
1997) (granting in part motion to reconsider, though no change in law or new evidence existed);
see also Servants of the Paraclete v. Docs, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000) (listing manifest
injustice as one of three independent grounds supporting a motion for reconsideration). Indeed,
IBM previously prevailed upon the Magistrate Court to reconsider a prior order in this case in the
absence of any new evidence or change of law. In its February 11, 2005 motion, IBM made
arguments it had previously raised and contended that the Magistrate Court had failed to consider
correctly the controlling standard of law. In an April 20, 2005 order, the prior order was
reconsidered and relief was granted in part. It is therefore disingenuous for IBM to contend that
the Court cannot consider arguments that were raised below. Even by IBM's prior standard, this
Court would have the discretion to reconsider its November Order on any grounds to prevent
manifest injustice and correct clear error.
IBM also argues that the Court cannot hear arguments that SCO did not raise below
because they are waived. Clearly that is not the law. To the contrary, to prevent manifest
injustice and correct clear error, a court has the discretion to reconsider a prior order regardless
of whether the arguments had been previously raised. See, e.g., Maxfield, 2007 WL 121128, at
*1 (Ex. A) (granting motion for reconsideration based on new arguments not previously raised
though no excuse was offered for why the arguments were not raised in the earlier briefing);
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Belmont, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 342-43 (rejecting defendant's argument that motion to reconsider
should not be considered on the merits because the "full arguments on the merits raise legal
questions that were not previously considered in these proceedings").
II. The Court Should Reconsider Its Order to Permit Full and Fair Consideration
of Expert Reports.
The parties' now complete expert reports (and expert depositions) demonstrate IBM's lack of
prejudice and SCO's lack of culpability -- two factors that the November Order should have
considered. Gripe, 312 F.3d at 1187. IBM does not dispute the relevance of those factors. The
responses that IBM does raise should be rejected.
First, IBM misstates the issue (at 3) in arguing that "expert reports were not required for
Magistrate Judge Wells to rule." Consideration of the reports would have assisted the Court in
understanding, in this complex matter, that the stricken technology items were disclosed in sufficient
detail for IBM to prepare a defense and that concerns of sandbagging were unwarranted. IBM's
expert reports would have shown the Court that IBM's experts did not even make use to any degree
of the source code coordinates that were provided by SCO. As such, consideration of the complete
reports would have undercut any finding that IBM was prejudiced.
Second, IBM states (at 3) that "SCO was free to submit a declaration from any of its experts
with its opposition to IBM's motion." Again, this misses the point. While SCO submitted a
declaration from Mr. Rochkind, one of its experts, in response to IBM's tendering an expert
declaration with its reply, full expert reports were neither complete nor under this Court's schedule
ought to have been complete at the time of the briefing and argument on IBM's motion. IBM filed
its opening brief in February 2006; SCO filed its opposition on March 7, 2006; and by April 2006,
the motion had been fully briefed and heard by the Court. Initial expert reports were not due until
5
May 19, 2006 -- over a month after the hearing on IBM's motion. Thus, the expert reports could not
have been made part of the record before the Magistrate Judge on this Motion. For this reason,
without success, SCO urged the Magistrate Judge to wait until expert reports could be considered.
(Tr. April 14, 2006 Hearing at 52:13-53:1.) This request was refused. SCO asked for leave to
submit further materials in response to IBM's filing of an additional declaration from Dr. Davis
after oral argument; that request was also refused. SCO then raised this problem again in its
Objections (at 45) on July 13, 2006. At this point, the two latter rounds of expert rebuttal reports had
still not been completed, and expert depositions had not even commenced.1The Court then issued its
November Order without reference to SCO's argument that expert discovery had not been
completed. This is precisely the type of situation in which a motion to reconsider is now
appropriately raised.
Third, IBM asserts that the expert reports failed to supply the allegedly "missing
coordinates" for code. But the point of considering the expert reports is that they would make
clear that the "method and concept" technologies at issue are amply identified without such code.
The expert reports put them in context, and IBM's rebuttal expert reports show that the code
coordinates are not necessary for IBM to respond (notwithstanding self-serving conclusory
statements by each of IBM experts to the contrary).
Fourth, IBM alleges that SCO waived the argument by not presenting it until oral argument
before the Magistrate Court. But oral argument was the first opportunity to raise the issue because
IBM did not file any declarations with its initial moving papers. Instead, IBM filed an unsupported
6
nine-page motion. Only in its reply papers, obviously filed after SCO filed its opposition, did IBM
file Dr. Davis's declaration. Neither of the waiver cases cited by IBM are applicable here.2
Fifth, IBM claims the Court cannot consider this issue because it was previously briefed by
SCO. This argument ignores that the Court is authorized to reconsider its order if necessary to
prevent manifest injustice, and that IBM itself has also moved for reconsideration on the basis of
previously raised arguments in this case. See Mantle Ranches, 950 F. Supp. at 300, 302; Maxfield,
2007 WL 121128, at *1 (Ex. A); see also Servants of the Paraclete, 204 F. 3d at 1012.
III. The Court Should Permit SCO Four Limited Depositions and Then Reconsider
Its Order Based on That Testimony.
SCO also seeks limited depositions of the four IBM programmers best situated to provide
the information the Court has required. These depositions would demonstrate either that IBM
had access to the very information it contended was not available to it, or that the information
could not be obtained either of which would also undercut the requisite findings that SCO was
culpable and that IBM was prejudiced.
IBM does not dispute that if anyone should know the coordinates to the AIX or Dynix
code from which these methods and concepts were taken, it is these IBM programmers
themselves. Instead, IBM contends (at 6) that an admission by its programmers that they know
the specific Dynix source code behind their methods and concept disclosures to Linux would not
7
have changed the outcome of the motion. This is a remarkable argument. This is the very
information that IBM has complained that it cannot ascertain without undue prejudice. How
could an admission by its programmers that they already have that very information not
undermine IBM's claim of prejudice?
IBM asserts that the programmers would not provide any detail on either the UNIX
System V or the Linux source code coordinates. Both of these arguments are red herrings.
SCO's argument, as IBM well knows, is that the Dynix and AIX systems are derivative works of
UNIX System V, protected as such by the license agreements. SCO is not claiming that the
methods and concepts at issue are located in System V, but in a derivative equally protected by
the language of the license agreements. As to the location in Linux, SCO's December
Submission identified files in Linux which were affected by the disclosure, and Mr. Rochkind's
declaration made clear that these references were of course to the versions of Linux released
after the disclosure. A disclosure of a file identifies all the lines of code in that file. Moreover,
there has been no finding that a more precise level of identification than specific files in Linux
could have been made or establishing any prejudice to IBM from the file level specificity that
was provided for Linux or holding that more is required to support SCO's breach of contract
claims.
IBM also fails to identify any prejudice that would result from the depositions. The trial
date has been adjusted for months. If the requested depositions are not beneficial, moreover,
SCO has offered to pay the expenses incurred by IBM in connection with the depositions. In
contrast, if the depositions do show what SCO contends they will, IBM's representations would
8
be proven wrong and an essential basis for the November Order would be discredited. In short,
manifest injustice would be prevented.
In the face of this compelling justification for the depositions to go forward, IBM again
raises various procedural arguments to cloak the merits of SCO's request. Again, all such
arguments overlook the central tenet of the cases that this Court has the discretion to grant the
requested relief and reconsider its order to prevent manifest injustice. The procedural arguments
are also errant on their own terms.
IBM contends (at 5) that the evidence cannot be considered because it is not "new" in
that SCO does not have the evidence, but rather needs to take depositions to procure the
evidence. However, no rule prohibits allowing the four depositions on a limited subject where,
as here, they would uncover new evidence that would correct a clear error in a court's factual
finding or prevent a manifest injustice, and no prejudice results.3IBM's suggestion to the
contrary threatens to nullify this Court's well-established discretion on motions for
reconsideration.
IBM also argues (at 5) that this evidence was previously available and SCO declined to
pursue it. It cannot be fairly said that this testimony was available to SCO at the time these
proposed witnesses were deposed, or at any time prior to the Court's Order striking the disputed
items. It was the June Order and the November Order that held that the missing information was
9
required. Until then, SCO had no reason to seek the specific coordinates in IBM depositions.
Indeed, the fact that SCO did not seek such information at depositions underscores SCO's
reasonable, good faith belief that it had not been required to provide such information, and that
SCO was not and is not guilty of "sandbagging" as IBM often alleges.4
Finally, IBM argues (at 6) that SCO waived the argument regarding the depositions
because SCO did not make the argument before Judge Wells, and somewhat inconsistently
that the Court cannot consider the argument because SCO did raise it in its Objections (at 46-50).
Neither argument is correct. What SCO specifically requested, both in the hearing before the
Magistrate Court (Tr. at 52:4-12 and 82:10-17) and in its Objections (at 11-12, 39-45), was an
item-by-item evidentiary hearing and particularized findings, such as whether each challenged
item was "sufficiently specific" for IBM to defend, and whether SCO had the "capacity" or
"ability" to comply as to that item. If this request had been granted, the depositions would have
been unnecessary, for such evidence would have been obtained and considered at the hearing. In
the absence of the evidentiary hearing (which was never held), the deposition testimony SCO
now requests would fill the evidentiary void on these very issues.5
IV. At a Minimum, the Court Should Reconsider Its Motion as It Relates to Ten
Stricken Items.
SCO also seeks at a minimum reconsideration of a limited number of stricken claims that
were not substantively addressed in either the June Order or the November Order, and which
plainly met the level of specificity required in the June Order. In its opening brief (at 6-7), SCO
10
set forth the reasons the Court's findings are plainly inapplicable to these items. IBM has not
responded substantively to any of these specific items, or explained how they possibly fall within
the rationale for the June and November Orders or how manifest inconsistencies do not result
from the dismissal of these items.
Instead, IBM has raised a series of collateral arguments none of which would justify
ignoring the substantive arguments SCO has raised on these items. First, IBM argues (at 8-9)
that the Magistrate Court and this Court considered these specific items and that they already
reached certain conclusions regarding these items. This argument flatly contradicts the grounds
for reconsideration that IBM asserted earlier in the case. Indeed, even if such a review was
undertaken, that does not mean that these items should not be reconsidered in the instant motion
on the grounds listed by SCO, where the error as to those items was manifest and there were
profound inconsistencies in the way certain similar items were treated. IBM's argument also
misapprehends the nature of a de novo review and overlooks the fact that the Tenth Circuit
requires an express determination on the record of each of the factors relevant to the sanction
imposed. Gripe, 312 F.3d at 1187. No express consideration of the factors related to these items
was undertaken in the November Order, creating a manifest injustice for the reasons
demonstrated by SCO in its initial brief (at 6-7).
Second, IBM insists (at 9) that SCO's request is a "Trojan Horse" and that, under the
"guise of seeking 'limited reconsideration,' SCO seeks to undermine the rationale of the Court's
decision as to the remaining 177 items (as to which its failings are not different)." The argument
is peculiar. Certainly a motion to reconsider should not be denied, as IBM suggests, just because
the limited reconsideration sought could prove false the broader premise of an order. To the
11
contrary, if a limited reconsideration did truly undermine the broader rationale of the order, that
would provide an even more compelling reason to grant the motion for reconsideration to
prevent manifest injustice. In other words, if reconsideration of these ten items did undermine
the Court's confidence in its initial order, that is all the more reason that such limited
reconsideration of these ten items is warranted. In any event, this aspect of SCO's Motion is
limited to the ten items on which reconsideration is requested.
Third, IBM argues (at 9-10) that SCO waived its argument that certain stricken methods
and concepts (Items 3, 4, and 15) are akin to the non-stricken "negative know how" items,
because it was not raised in SCO's objections. This argument does not fairly describe the record.
In its Objections, SCO clearly asked (at 11-12 and 39-45) for an item-by-item consideration and
evidentiary hearing on each of the stricken items precisely to address this type of inconsistency
and other such issues in the June Order.6This request was not granted. In the absence of such a
hearing, SCO is seeking an item-by-item consideration on certain discrete items, for which the
error is clear, in order to prevent manifest injustice. The Court has the discretion to grant such
relief.
IBM's final contention (at 10) that reconsideration of these items would unleash a
veritable parade of horribles, such as reopening fact discovery, redoing expert reports and
depositions, and redoing summary judgment briefing, is unsupported and highly misleading.
Fact discovery was already closed at the time of the June Order and would not need to be
reopened. SCO's initial expert reports, submitted before the June Order, already discuss the
12
stricken items. The summary judgment briefs could not possibly be impacted by reconsideration
of the Order, because the motions do not relate to the misused material identified by SCO, which
presents a factual, not legal, question. Therefore, reconsideration of these discrete items would
at most require the exchange of limited expert reports disclosing IBM's anticipated expert
testimony on the items and SCO's rebuttal to that testimony, and perhaps short depositions on
these limited subjects. In light of the delayed trial date, there is no reason this could not be
completed without any impact on the trial schedule. It is a small price to pay to prevent the
manifest injustice that was caused by the striking of these items.
13
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, SCO prays that this Court will reconsider its Order of
November 29, 2006, and grant relief as requested above.
DATED this 2nd day of February, 2007.
HATCH, JAMES & DODGE, P.C.
Brent O. Hatch
Mark F. James
BOIES, SCHILLER & FLEXNER LLP
Robert Silver
Stuart H. Singer
Stephen N. Zack
Edward Normand
By /s/ Mark F. James
Counsel for The SCO Group, Inc.
1
Contrary to IBM's implication that SCO did not make the reports available to the Court, SCO properly
noted in its Objections (at 45 n.14) that two of the initial expert reports were filed with and available to the
Court in connection with another motion.
2
In Thomas v. Denny's, Inc., 111 F.3d 1506 (10th Cir. 1997), the waiver issue related to a factual
assertion at an appellate argument contradicted by the party's brief and by the record, and notably, the
court did address the argument so raised. Id. at 1510 n.5. Similarly, in Acker v. Burlington Northern &
Santa Fe Railway Co., 388 F. Supp. 2d 1299 (D. Kan. 2005), the court did not consider arguments raised
for the first time in a reply, when the opposing party had no further chance to respond. Id. at 1202 n.2. In
contrast, SCO's suggestion was made during an oral argument, when both sides were able to articulate
their support for or opposition to the argument. Indeed, IBM's submission of a post-argument declaration
from Dr. Davis in which was raised what the Magistrate Court called the most important point should
have been excluded under the cases IBM cites.
3 The cases cited by IBM are not to the contrary. Cf. Belmont, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 346 (denying
plaintiff's request to reopen all discovery to find "potential" additional violation to support his case);
Naiman v. N.Y. Univ. Hosp. Ctr., No. 95-6469, 2005 WL 926904, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2005) (Opp'n
to SCO Mot. For Recons., 1-19-07, Ex. F) (denying request to reopen discovery to permit polygraph
examination where request was inappropriate under a local rule and the additional discovery would not
change the court's decision); Poddar v. State Bank of India, No. 98-1691, 2006 WL 2092469, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2006) (denying request to reopen discovery in one sentence, where request that was
"new and vague") (Opp'n to SCO Mot. For Recons., 1-19-07, Ex. E).
4 As such, the cases cited by IBM are inapposite. Both are cases where the courts found that the moving
party could have previously discovered the evidence. Cf. Webber, 43 F.3d at 1345; Caprin, 2001 WL
740535, at *1 (Opp'n to SCO Mot. For Recons., 1-19-07, Ex. C).
5 The cases cited by IBM (at 7) involve parties who tried to raise entirely new arguments.
6 IBM's additional argument (at 10) that the items listed by SCO cannot be similar to the "negative know
how" items because they are "methods and concepts" misapprehends SCO's point. SCO asserts that these
items are substantially similar to the items described as "negative know how" (23, 43, and 90) in so far as
these items are not susceptible to line, file and version identification.
14
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Plaintiff/Counterclaim-Defendant, The SCO Group, Inc., hereby certifies that a true and
correct copy of the foregoing SCO's MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION was served on Defendant/Counterclaim-Plaintiff, International Business
Machines Corporation, on this 2nd day of February, 2007, via the CM/ECF system:
David Marriott, Esq. (email)
Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP
[address]
Todd Shaughnessy, Esq. (email) Snell & Wilmer LLP [address]
By /s/ Mark F. James
15
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Authored by: webster on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 01:10 AM EST |
..
....of the form, not the substance.
---
webster
[ Reply to This | # ]
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Authored by: entre on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 01:16 AM EST |
There are plenty today. [ Reply to This | # ]
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- Any major ODF update from MA? - Authored by: Anonymous on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 02:19 AM EST
- Now Linus! - Authored by: Anonymous on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 02:34 AM EST
- Sigh - Authored by: jplatt39 on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 06:10 AM EST
- Now Linus! - Authored by: Anonymous on Sunday, February 04 2007 @ 01:02 AM EST
- Novell could be banned from selling Linux - Authored by: Chris Lingard on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 05:33 AM EST
- Novell could and should be banned from selling Linux, not just because of the M$ deal - Authored by: tiger99 on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 07:13 AM EST
- Novell could and should be banned from selling Linux, not just because of the M$ deal - Authored by: bstone on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 09:01 AM EST
- Novell could and should be banned from selling Linux, not just because of the M$ deal - Authored by: PTrenholme on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 09:52 AM EST
- Novell could and should be banned from selling Linux, not just because of the M$ deal - Authored by: Anonymous on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 10:28 AM EST
- It depends, what kind of offer is it? - Authored by: Anonymous on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 11:33 AM EST
- Novell could and should be banned from selling Linux, not just because of the M$ deal - Authored by: Anonymous on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 06:06 PM EST
- on a medium customarily used for software interchange; - Authored by: Anonymous on Monday, February 05 2007 @ 01:35 PM EST
- Novell could be banned from selling Linux - Authored by: tredman on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 08:45 AM EST
- I'm staying away from SuSE for now / Microsoft loves this stuff - Authored by: clark_kent on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 09:19 AM EST
- Novell could be banned from selling Linux - Authored by: Anonymous on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 10:36 AM EST
- Linus != community - Authored by: Anonymous on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 10:51 AM EST
- Novell could be banned from selling Linux - Authored by: stites on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 01:59 PM EST
- Time For a New Sig - Authored by: Simon G Best on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 06:13 AM EST
- Another approach to receiving&sending .doc files - Authored by: Anonymous on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 06:24 AM EST
- Hilarious take on Oracle - Authored by: jplatt39 on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 07:29 AM EST
- Love the Linux Genuine Advantage :) - Authored by: Anonymous on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 07:40 AM EST
- Mwahaha...Oh, Wait. That's Not What PJ Meant - Authored by: TheBlueSkyRanger on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 08:46 AM EST
- Dell Slapped with 1bn Lawsuit Over Kickbacks - Authored by: Anonymous on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 10:50 AM EST
- Vista in the news - Authored by: Anonymous on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 03:36 PM EST
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Authored by: entre on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 01:25 AM EST |
"SCO’s argument, as IBM well knows, is that the Dynix and AIX systems are
derivative works of UNIX System V, protected as such by the license agreements.
SCO is not claiming that the methods and concepts at issue are located in System
V, but in a derivative – equally protected by the language of the license
agreements."
PJ, Is this the last minute trick claim the jury was going to hear, the
"surpise" Darl Mcbride spoke about that was going to win the case? He
just got it in anyway did he not? Maybe not at the jury but certainly at the
last minute...[ Reply to This | # ]
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Authored by: PM on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 01:41 AM EST |
"What is evident from IBM’s opposition is that it strongly prefers this
case to be decided on a conglomeration of procedural issues rather than the
merits of SCO’s case."
Considering that IBM has put up at least four separate legal arguments, for each
summary judgement claim or counter claim, it is not surprising there is a
conglomeration of issues. In each instance, IBM 'wins' if at least one of the
arguments is accepted.
The court cannot really consider the merits of SCO's case unless it has one.
Nothing on the horizon so far.
[ Reply to This | # ]
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Authored by: snakebitehurts on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 02:08 AM EST |
Bwahahahahaha
Stop it SCO, you're killing me !
Another keyboard needs cleaning .......
Bwahahahahaha!!!
I would really love IBM to just once mention the foot gun SCO has so wonderfully
mastered.[ Reply to This | # ]
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Authored by: webster on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 02:40 AM EST |
..
SCO is right. The Court has discretion. It can reconsider and reverse itself.
But they have to give him a reason to want to do that.
SCO tries. The expert reports weren't available at the time the motion was
considered. BUT the code was! Didn't SCO have their experts look at it during
the past three years? Or at least since the last load of code?
Also they say that the depositions of the four programmers would undermine IBM.
Also allow the ten discrete unmentioned items. Since they weren't specifically
mentioned in the order, how do we know that Judge Wells properly considered
them? Or your Honor properly considered them, de novo no less, and now properly
reconsider them?
The November Order is clearly in error and Your Honor and Judge Wells are
manifestly unjust to SCO.
At the top of page two we ride a SCO merry-go-round argument: "... Tenth
Circuit requires consideration of the "Ehrenhaus factors" ... before
... claims can be dismissed ... The Court must consider the actual prejudice to
IBM and the culpability of SCO. ... SCO goes directly to these factors. IBM has
not disputed that the Ehrenhaus factors had to be considered." Therefore
they must agree with us in every particular.
SCO has never explained why they didn't put the expert references in the final
December disclosures. Was it lawyer error? Did they get the expert reports
late? They give five arguments but no explanation. They lapse into procedural
arguments to no effect. The simple arguments are strong against them.
The methods and concepts ...well if one had the patience to follow them as
closely as PJ does, one would be more amused... but the good Judge's eyes at
this point must be rolling back up into his head. If they don't give an
explanation, they don't deserve a shot. Why didn't they include the expert
code? They were warned about it. Final is final, ...er after interim final.
They disclosed little. They discovered less, and now they are asking for more
discovery. Not just asking to reconsider that which was stricken. What
explains them? Error or a great lack of evidence? Are they just punishing IBM
for not settling?
SCO has twisted and ignored discovery orders for three years. They will not be
rewarded for it.
---
webster
[ Reply to This | # ]
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- SCO's Redacted Reply Memo in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, as text - Authored by: Anonymous on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 03:08 AM EST
- SCO's Redacted Reply Memo in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, as text - Authored by: Maserati on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 03:52 AM EST
- SCO's Redacted Reply Memo in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, as text - Authored by: Anonymous on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 07:46 AM EST
- SCO's Redacted Reply Memo in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, as text - Authored by: Anonymous on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 11:10 AM EST
- Ehrenrause factors - sounds like a Ludlum novel - Authored by: skidrash on Sunday, February 04 2007 @ 12:27 AM EST
- Ehrenhaus factors/manifest injustice - Authored by: hardmath on Sunday, February 04 2007 @ 05:24 AM EST
- SCO's Redacted Reply Memo in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, as text - Authored by: tanner andrews on Tuesday, February 06 2007 @ 10:36 PM EST
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Authored by: kawabago on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 02:59 AM EST |
I could see the judge doing something like this,
"Fine. Motion to reconsider granted...I've reconsidered, the sanction is
upheld. IBM will you draw up the order?"[ Reply to This | # ]
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Authored by: Anonymous on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 03:11 AM EST |
they're great at finding cases to cite that on the surface appear to support
their position... but continually astound us with their ineptitude at actually
following through each entire cited case to see if it actually does support and
was actually upheld in court and survived any appeals...[ Reply to This | # ]
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Authored by: BobinAlaska on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 03:28 AM EST |
I lost count of the number of times we see,"manifest injustice," in
this piece of fiction. They are really trying to get the judge to feel like if
he doesn't reconsider they will complain again to someone else. Can they?
Also, did you notice that, "SCO's good faith," got put in there
again?
---
Bob Helm, Juneau, Alaska
[ Reply to This | # ]
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Authored by: skidrash on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 04:01 AM EST |
else this would be another opportunity to bring out and show Darl's footgun to
the court.
I'm sure the court would like to hear, yet again, from Darl and Sontag and
Stowell how their 3 teams of deep divers found many millions of mountains of
SysV code in Linux, put there by IBM.
This is the last brief in the series, right? too bad. [ Reply to This | # ]
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Authored by: jbb on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 04:11 AM EST |
SCO says AIX is a derivative of Sys V.
SCO says Linux is a derivative of
AIX.
Hence Linux is a derivative of a derivative, or in other
words, it is
a second derivative. Linux is
not merely accelerating, it is the embodiment
of
acceleration.
--- You just can't win with DRM. [ Reply to This | # ]
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Authored by: Anonymous on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 04:53 AM EST |
SCO lies to the court time and time again and gets away with it. I thought it
was illegal for a lwayer to deceive the court but apparently not -
In 954 they say they could not have violated the GPL because they distributed
the disks they got from SuSE. This is an outright lie, they got the disks from
United Linux, of which they are a member and they made contributions to that
distribution. It is like blaming Kinko's for copyright infringement when you
had them reproduce copyrighted material, which you then took possesion of an
used. This is outright deception and I hope IBM makes use of the tons of
material they got about United Linux to hang them on this.
[ Reply to This | # ]
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Authored by: DaveJakeman on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 04:54 AM EST |
What is evident from IBM’s opposition is that it strongly prefers
this case to be decided on a conglomeration of procedural issues rather than the
merits of SCO’s case.
Oh bother, skip the text, see the
sig.
--- I would rather stand corrected than sit confused.
---
Should one hear an accusation, try it on the accuser. [ Reply to This | # ]
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Authored by: Ian Al on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 05:22 AM EST |
Neither judge sought my views before coming to a conclusion and this is
manifestly unfair. Come on, Kimball, it's not too late! You have full
discretion.
On the other hand, SCOG got a point wrong.
SCO
also seeks at a minimum reconsideration of a limited number of stricken claims
No claims were stricken in the exercise of this sanction. I'm
sure I told them off about this, before. Or, perhaps it was PJ
;-)
--- Regards
Ian Al [ Reply to This | # ]
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Authored by: Anonymous on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 06:09 AM EST |
This isn't funny, or silly. It's just an outstanding law company doing a
superb job.
To understand what is going on here, you have to understand
what BSF have been told to do. Their task is:
"Prolong this litigation
as long as possible."
That's what they're doing. They have already
dragged it out longer than many people believed possible, and realistically,
trial is nowhere in sight (yes, it's scheduled, but I'll bet my entire
net worth to one cent that it gets rescheduled.) [ Reply to This | # ]
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Authored by: Anonymous on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 07:58 AM EST |
From the end of page 9 to the top of page 10 SCO says
It was the
June Order and the November Order that held that the missing
information was
required. Until then, SCO had no reason to seek the specific
coordinates in IBM
depositions.
[ Reply to This | # ]
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Authored by: Steve Martin on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 08:31 AM EST |
Not to jump the gun, but I went ahead and snuck a peek at the GPL filing
(TSG's Memorandum in Opposition to IBM's PSJ on their Eighth Counterclaim, the
GPL infringement counterclaim) on PACER. Here's a sample...
IBM's
motion for summary judgment should be denied for at least the following
reasons:
First, SCO has fully complied with, and has not
repudiated or breached, the GPL.
(Uh, huh. I guess all those letters to
Congress calling the GPL "viral", a "threat to the U.S. information
industry", to "our international competitive position", and to "our national
security", and claiming that the GPL "undermine[s] the foundation of one of our
most important industries" doesn't count as "repudiation". And I suppose that
distribution of GPL'd software on your Web site after those letters doesn't
count either.)
Second, even if SCO had somehow repudiated or
breached the GPL, there is no authority for IBM's theory that the alleged
repudiation or breach — which postdated SCO's suspension of its Linux
distributions — retroactively terminated SCO's rights to distribute Linux
under the GPL.
(But according to
IBM, your distribution of SCO Linux 4.0 [as late as May 31 '04]
post-dated your alleged repudiation [Jan 21 '04] in your letters to
Congress and post-dated your attempts to relicense portions of Linux code
under a license other than the GPL [for example, your negotiations with
EV1 in January 2004].)
Third, because Linux is an
infringing derivative work of SCO's UNIX System V, IBM cannot assert rights in
Linux under Tenth Circuit law.
(But I thought you said the material
you were complaining about was not in System V. You certainly didn't
demonstrate any "chain of derivation" between System V and Linux in your Final
Disclosures, even after having begged for all of CMVC for that precise purpose,
did you?)
Fourth, IBM's proposed interpretation of the GPL
should be rejected as against public policy and the law. The GPL should not be
read to interfere with SCO's right to enforce its own intellectual property
rights, or to allow a competitor to decide what SCO may charge for an
intellectual property license.
(Certainly. You guys may charge
whatever you like for licensing your own code. Just where is that, again?
Hm?)
Fifth, IBM comes to the court with unclean hands. IBM
seeks to enforce its alleged copyrights after having itself misappropriated
SCO's proprietary source code, and after attempting to obtain purported evidence
for its claims by hacking into SCO's website.
(Oh, brother, here we
go again with the "hacking" nonsense. Oh, by the way, refresh my memory... just
what proprietary source code was it that IBM allegedly
misappropriated?)
I can hardly wait to see what IBM
makes of this in their Reply Memorandum.
--- "When I say something, I
put my name next to it." -- Isaac Jaffee, "Sports Night" [ Reply to This | # ]
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Authored by: gvc on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 08:35 AM EST |
I don't agree with PJ that this is a new revelation:
SCO is not
claiming that the methods and concepts at issue are located in System V, but in
a derivative – equally protected by the language of the license
agreements.
This viral definition of derivative work has
always been the core of the case, and often discussed here. It depends
on:
- proof that {AIX, Dynix} is a derivative work
- argument that
adding X to {AIX, Dynix} renders X subject to the "keep all derivative works
secret" clause of the contract, even when X is removed from {AIX,
Dynix}
What is new about that statement is that it actually
stipulates that's all there is to their case. In the past they have used a
smokescreen to intimate that there were components that infringed for reasons
other than the reasons stated above. Now they've explicitly said that these
components do not exist in Unix, so they have handed IBM the clarity they were
looking for.
Now, has SCO proved that anything with the moniker {AIX, Dynix}
is derivative, and anything ever used in them is therefore derivative (or, more
precisely "part" of a derivative work) in it own right, even when deployed
independently? I think that interpretation is preposterous but it it is a legal
argument to be settled by a judge.
There are a couple of precedents on the
books, but I'm afraid I've forgotten the references. One involves taking
pictures from a book and mounting them in frames. Are the framed pictures
derivative works of the original art? But even that case didn't ask, "if you
remove the pictures from the frames, are the frames still derivative because
they once contained the pictures?" Another involves collecting maps together
into an atlas. Is the atlas a derivative work or simply a collection?
I'll
paraphrase my interpretation of the court's ruling in both cases: a work is
deriviative only if the "value-add" from whatever is added to it itself
copyrightable above and beyond the components. So the framed picture is not a
derivative work, as there's insufficient creative input to framing to be
copyrightable. But the atlas is a derivative work because the cover art,
contents, selection of maps, and so on is itself copyrightable.
So, suppose
you have, say, Unix which IBM hacks to result in AIX. Is the hacked product
derivative? I think so -- not that I have seen proof from SCO of this. Now you
take JFS, which is copyrightable by itself, and combine it with AIX. Is the
resulting combination a derivative work of AIX or of JFS? I doubt it, but if it
is, it is so only to the extent of the novelty of the integration
effort.
Nevertheless, one could argue that it is, and therefore that the
license that demands that "all parts" of the derivative work -- of which JFS has
just become one -- are governed by the agreements.
I am not a lawyer;
however, I find the argument resembles the sort of word play that children are
fond of using to reach absurd conclusions. Quite plainly, it seems to me, the
contract applies to parts of derivative works so long as they continue to be
parts of the work; once removed, they are no longer "parts of a derivative work"
unless they themselves contain some aspect of Unix.
[ Reply to This | # ]
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Authored by: Anonymous on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 08:45 AM EST |
"SCO’s argument, as IBM well knows, is that the Dynix and AIX systems are
derivative works of UNIX System V, protected as such by the license agreements.
SCO is not claiming that the methods and concepts at issue are located in System
V, but in a derivative – equally protected by the language of the license
agreements."
At some point I look forward to the Judge building up SCO's
hopes by appearing to agree with them, then dashing them on the rocks.
Something like...
"SCO contends that the contract requires a derivative work
of System V be subject to the same restrictions as System V itself and that
these restrictions also apply to a second generation work. In this, SCO is
correct.
"SCO further contends that the restrictions apply to all the code
of the derivative work and to all the code of second generation work. In this,
SCO is incorrect.
"The restrictions apply to System V code and hence to any
derivative work as a whole or any part of a derivative work that contains System
V code. A second generation work that contains System V code is itself a
derivative of System V and thus is as a whole and those parts that contain
System V code subject to the restrictions on System V code.
"Any portion of
the code in a derivative work that does not by itself contain any System V code
is not bound by the restrictions protecting System V code. A second generation
work that does not contain any System V code is not a derivative of System V and
is not restricted either in part or whole."
Only doing a much more eloquent
and effective job of building up SCO's hopes before crushing them. [ Reply to This | # ]
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Authored by: Anonymous on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 09:40 AM EST |
Whatever the Ehrenhaus factor might be to lawers, to a German speaker it is
something SCO will definitely never be and is incapable to ever reach: Ehrenhaus
translates into "house of honor" or "house of reputation",
where both honor and reputation are meant in a positive way. And not in that way
how SCO and BSF misuse it.[ Reply to This | # ]
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Authored by: PTrenholme on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 10:11 AM EST |
PJ, a minor question if I my. I can't recall seeing anything in the text you
posted indicating where any redactions took place. And a FF search for
"redacted" did not find the word in the posted text.
Is it possible that
they (SCOG) filed a sealed document when there was nothing in the filing that
needed to be sealed? --- IANAL, just a retired statistician [ Reply to This | # ]
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Authored by: Anonymous on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 11:40 AM EST |
PJ raised the point of their reference to Ehrenhaus and the Gripe
case and that perhaps BSF/SCOG did not read the case since it But
the case is not helpful to SCO, to my eyes. For one thing, it's a ruling where
the court refused to overturn the lower court's sanction against an attorney
that failed to follow the rules. Perhaps BSF/SCOG is trying to use
this case to perhaps limit the sanctions against them when they are finally
made? Just a thought.[ Reply to This | # ]
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Authored by: Anonymous on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 11:47 AM EST |
For the first time, SCO forthrightly states the "derivative of a
derivative" theory. (They've hinted before, but never come right out and
said it, not that I can recall.)
And where do they do it? In a reply! IBM doesn't actually get to file paper in
response to this. All they can do is argue about it verbally. Nasty.
MSS2[ Reply to This | # ]
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- And "Clever" Too - Authored by: sproggit on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 01:20 PM EST
- Nasty - Authored by: Anonymous on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 10:04 PM EST
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Authored by: Anonymous on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 12:41 PM EST |
I can sue you for YOUR innovation. Let us set the stage to M$ to start
suing......
When will all these old hippies die!!!!
<sigh>
No trolling intended.
wb[ Reply to This | # ]
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Authored by: AcousticZen on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 01:52 PM EST |
I have to vote for the below quote to be the best line of SCO's memo. HOW many
times were they told to identify what code was misused????? How many requests
did IBM make, and how many court orders were made, to produce just such a list?
If anything, it is gutsy of SCO to NOW claim that they had no reason to look for
code "coordinates", and they had acted in "good faith" this
whole time. Laughable, just laughable.
"IBM also argues (at 5) that this evidence was previously available and SCO
declined to pursue it. It cannot be fairly said that this testimony was
available to SCO at the time these proposed witnesses were deposed, or at any
time prior to the Court's Order striking the disputed items. It was the June
Order and the November Order that held that the missing information was
required. Until then, SCO had no reason to seek the specific coordinates in IBM
depositions. Indeed, the fact that SCO did not seek such information at
depositions underscores SCO's reasonable, good faith belief that it had not been
required to provide such information, and that SCO was not and is not guilty of
"sandbagging" as IBM often alleges."[ Reply to This | # ]
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Authored by: Anonymous on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 02:01 PM EST |
The summary judgment briefs could not possibly be impacted by
reconsideration of the Order, because the motions do not relate to the misused
material identified by SCO, which presents a factual, not legal, question.
Did SCO really say this? Then perhaps we should proceed first
with the summary judgement motions, because it is possible that all of SCO's
causes of action could be dismissed, in which case the motion for
reconsideration becomes moot.[ Reply to This | # ]
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Authored by: Anonymous on Saturday, February 03 2007 @ 06:41 PM EST |
How appropriate a phrase, though with a different meaning.
Tufty
[ Reply to This | # ]
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- Golden Fleece - Authored by: PJ on Wednesday, February 07 2007 @ 03:51 PM EST
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Authored by: Anonymous on Sunday, February 04 2007 @ 12:49 PM EST |
"Manifest" means clear or obvious.
It is a little milder than "blatant",
but not by much.
Does it have this same meaning in a legal context?
If so then a "manifest injustice" would be one that is
apparent from information already available. SCO's argument
that they need futher discovery would be an admission
that the alleged injustice is not "manifest".[ Reply to This | # ]
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Authored by: GLJason on Sunday, February 04 2007 @ 02:32 PM EST |
Before imposing dismissal as a sanction, a district court should
ordinarily evaluate the following factors on the record:
I
think the highlighting should be here (maybe both places):
Before
imposing dismissal as a sanction, a district court should ordinarily
evaluate the following factors on the record:
The court isn't
dismissing any part of SCO's action, they are simply ruling on the evidence that
may be used at trial.[ Reply to This | # ]
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Authored by: Anonymous on Monday, February 05 2007 @ 04:04 AM EST |
> SCO tries to bully the judge: "The failure to grant a motion
> for reconsideration can constitute an abuse of discretion."
Interesting point. I think several lawyers had predicted that would happen: SCO
insulting style tries to provoke other parties (judge/court and IBM) to err.
Or is it only me who is reading here a pitch?[ Reply to This | # ]
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