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]	9	THE SCO GROUP,
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-d	11) Plaintiff,)
]	12	vs.) Case 2:03-CV-294
7	13)
 -1	14	INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES) CORPORATION,)
]	15)
7	16	Defendant/Counterclaim-Plaintiff))
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]	18	BEFORE THE HONORABLE DALE A. KIMBALL
7	19	FEBRUARY 24, 2006
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	21	MOTION HEARING
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	25	Reported by: KELLY BROWN, HICKEN CSR, RPR, RMR

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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 2006

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THE COURT: Calling now the case of SCO Group,

Incorporated, vs. International Business Machines Corporation.

I'm going to in a moment ask counsel to state their

appearances for the record, as it looks like we have some new,

different or additional counsel for purposes of this hearing.

I would indicate before we begin that I did ask counsel to come to side bar for the purpose of handling some housekeeping matters related to some orders that need to be prepared and, as well, to indicate that there is a further motion that will be scheduled before me for hearing at a later date. And I've notified counsel as to which orders and what hearing that will be.

Counsel, if you'll state your appearances, please.

MR. HATCH: Your Honor, Brent Hatch and Mark James for SCO Group. With us is our client, Darwin McBride.

MR. SHAUGHNESSY: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Todd Shaughnessy and Curtis Drake for IBM.

THE COURT: Thank you, gentlemen.

As I indicated at side bar, I'd like to begin with the issue related to the depositions, particularly SCO's motion for leave to take prospective depositions, and that's found at docket Number 607. I have with regard to this motion as well as the other motion reviewed all the submissions from

both parties and am prepared to hear your arguments at this time.

Mr. Hatch?

MR. HATCH: Thank you very much, Your Honor. And as I understand it, when the motions were originally filed, there were some issues regarding which particular depositions would be at issue today here. And as I understand it, we have reached either through previous hearings with Your Honor or through agreement of the parties the handling of the depositions of Messrs. Messman, Chatlos, Wilson and Kennedy. So what we're talking about today are the 30(b)6 depositions of Intel, Oracle and the Open Group.

THE COURT: That's correct.

MR. HATCH: Your Honor, our position -- this has somewhat been I think unfortunately recast by counsel for IBM and also counsel for Intel, who has made an appearance, as a motion to extend the discovery cutoff. And we, of course, do not believe that that is really what this motion is. We believe this motion came about because we actually did properly subpoena each of these three parties prior to the discovery cutoff date. And the issues relating to that will go to I think timing and some other issues. But what we are seeking from the Court is the ongoing permission to complete these depositions for which there is either a dispute as to whether the parties should show up or frankly just a refusal

to appear.

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THE COURT: Mr. Hatch, before you go on, let me indicate for purposes of the record and so that you may address this, my concern in this regard is the order of, I think it was October 12th, wherein, it states:

The Court hereby increases the number of allowable depositions by 10 as to each side. However, all depositions must be completed by the applicable discovery cutoff date as set forth in Judge Kimball's July 1st, 2005, order. To the extent that such depositions cannot be completed within that period of time, they must be foregone. The Court will not entertain any motion for an extension of time to complete depositions. IBM's request for additional time to depose SCO's witnesses is denied. Both sides are required to adhere to the current rules on additional deposition days.

MR. HATCH: Right. I'm very familiar with that order, Your Honor. And I think the answer to that is frankly somewhat simple. Your Honor knows her order better than anyone, but I think it is not inconsistent with orders on any discovery cutoff date or anything that is provided under the rules.

What we are alleging here is that we did properly

notice up depositions that should have been taken in that time period, but for reasons related to these parties those depositions did not occur. And if the order was to be viewed in a hard-and-fast way, that for reasons that are outside of my client's control and out of my control, these depositions don't get taken, that would insert into this litigation or any litigation kind of an odd policy, which would be a motivation that would be provided to the other party and certainly to third parties to not cooperate in discovery with the hopes that a discovery date would be able to come and go.

And as a matter of fact, we met that here. And without casting aspersions on anybody, as the date got a little closer, we started to get those types of discussions from particularly third parties where magically they became unavailable until March.

And, you know, it wasn't a loss on us the fact that these people weren't being able to find dates in February and the fact that it had been become publicly known, one, your order; and, two, the date by which things had to be completed under your order. And I think if we took a very hard-and-fast look that even if it were third parties that caused this problem that that date was going to be held to, that provides a motivation to witnesses not to cooperate in discovery. And I don't think that was --

THE COURT: When were the subpoenas served upon

 them?

MR. HATCH: The original, these original subpoenas were served on January 12th with the deposition notices on January 13th.

THE COURT: And weren't they defective in some manner?

MR. HATCH: Yes, they were.

THE COURT: So when were the subpoenas that you would argue were properly served served and for what day?

MR. HATCH: Well, I think, Your Honor -- I think I know where you're going. I think the final service properly put together subpoenas was essentially a day before the cutoff date. But what isn't said in that and I think is said well in the case we've cited from the Fifth Circuit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and there really haven't been contrary cases cited by the other side, is that particularly when you're dealing with the corporation and people knowing what is going on, that these folks had the notice of the subpoenas well within a time period in which they could make the arrangements to appear. And largely what they were complaining about in this situation were technical deficiencies and ongoing discussions going on with the parties to resolve these.

But I think it goes a lot towards them understanding trying to take your order in a very, very rigid

interpretation, because --

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THE COURT: How do you interpret, Mr. Hatch, my order anything other than how it's phrased? It says, they must be foregone if they're not completed.

MR. HATCH: Let me give you an example, Your Honor. I mean, largely the types of things that they were objecting to in this particular instance were technical things like a check wasn't given with the original subpoena or that the topics were with the deposition notice and not with the subpoena itself. They weren't saying, we don't know about the dates. They weren't saying, we don't know what the topics are. They weren't saying it made any difference to them one way or the other to get the \$40, or whatever it is in this district nowadays. They were putting up a fight because they know there is a date. And if they put it off long enough, then they're going to have an argument, we don't have to show at all.

Now, if I take that to an extreme, we have just got a very onerous request for a lot of depositions, a lot of which I can complain on the same basis which they complain about the depositions that we've noticed, and am I to take it that the next discovery deadline is a hard-and-fast thing so if people are going to be out of town or just can't make it that they're out of luck? And I don't think so. And I think that's why parties are asked to cooperate in discovery in this

matter.

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And Intel, in particular, I think this is a telling example, Your Honor, that if you read, for instance, in Intel's brief closely here, because they're the ones who filed a brief as a third party complaining about this. And it's interesting to me that Intel, a third party, even, you know, picked up on this notion that there was even a cutoff because typically a third party that is in litigation, you know, they're just dealing with the subpoena and whether or not they're going to produce people because that's what they're obligated to. It isn't usually, we're going to fight you on the discovery cutoff because we don't want you to get discovery.

But in their own brief, in complaining about the fact that the original deposition notice in this case was faxed to them on January 12th -- now that's 15 days before the discovery cutoff. And in this district, at least in the practice as long as I've been here, that's considerably enough time before a deposition is taken to give notice.

THE COURT: Did you note, and I'm sure you have, the case, and I don't remember from what circuit, that said 30 days was insufficient?

MR. HATCH: I think it's a case by case. But, Your Honor, I know -- I think the practice in this district in both state and federal court for a long, long time has been it can

be less than 10 days. Certainly 10 days is more than adequate. And so they certainly cited nothing from this district, and it certainly isn't the practice of anyone I know in this district.

But what's more interesting here is, you know, they complain about not having discussions with us and about this 12th day, which is 15 days before. But what's more telling to me here is they say SCO's counsel had dealt with specific Intel outside counsel on these very matters as recently as 45 days earlier.

Well, they weren't raising it for that point. They were raising that for another point. But that's a very telling point, because what that says is they've admitted that SCO had been working with them since late November, because 45 days prior to January 12th would be late November, trying to get their deposition and talking to them about, and they say, these specific matters, in other words, the matters that are in the deposition notice, which are the topics, since November. So we didn't wait until the last minute. But they're trying to characterize these in a way, and that's why I find it quite interesting that now they try to cast this as we're trying to move the discovery date.

We're not trying to move the discovery date. We're trying to get discovery that we were seeking to get properly and were thwarted from getting by third parties, by IBM

potentially within the time period you set for us. We were ready, we were willing, and we wanted to take those.

Now, IBM, you know, to try to make this sound like it's our fault to Your Honor, and I take some umbrage of this, is they bring up the other depositions that we've now worked out. And they bring it up in a context, well, you know, SCO was asking for all of these other depositions outside the period.

Well, that's just simply not true. And that's couched in a way to make it look like SCO is really trying to do something that it's not here, because, for instance, in the context of the Novell witnesses, Mr. Chatlos and Mr. Messman, they came to us and said, we can't do it in the time period. And we told them, we've got a deadline. If IBM is agreeable, we're willing to accommodate you.

That isn't us asking to extend the deadline, as IBM has cast it in their brief. That is us saying, if it's okay with IBM and it can be stipulated with the Court, we will accommodate you, witnesses, third-party witnesses, but we have an obligation here.

Now, IBM was willing to do that. But I take some umbrage that they now cast that as that was our request, because it was not our request.

There are other issues regarding IBM witnesses,
Mr. Wilson and Mr. Kennedy, but we didn't ask for those to be

taken outside the period. IBM has agreed to produce them outside the period for reasons that were unique to Mr. Wilson and Mr. Kennedy. So at no time have we tried to cast this motion as one that we need additional time. But we do expect witnesses to show up when they're properly noticed inside that time period.

Now, you've identified the one small issue that, yes, when Bois Schiller filed these subpoenas originally, there were defects in them. But the Fifth Circuit and the District of Pennsylvania, which is the only case cited in this matter before you now found that technical defect that will not keep you from -- because the question, the only issue, the only real question is, did they have adequate notice? And they had that. They were raising technical defects toward discovery. And the purpose of the federal rules is not to thwart discovery, but it is to encourage discovery.

THE COURT: But if I accept your arguments,

Mr. Hatch, the rules and court orders have no enforceable

meaning. They mean nothing if they are intended to be bent or

broken.

MR. HATCH: But, again, I think that misses the point, Your Honor, because that is casting it as though we are responsible for missing that deadline. Now, maybe I can help by addressing one other issue, because maybe one of the things you're looking at, and you raised this earlier, is why did we

wait so late, okay.

Now, I don't think by doing it in a time period -and I know Your Honor is a practicing attorney, as well.

We've all done it, there are depositions for whatever reason
that get put to the end of the period. There's always going
to be one or two depositions that are at the end of the
period. That's just the way it works. I've yet to meet the
lawyer that gets it all done four months in advance. And
usually that can't be the case because just the way the case
develops, and particularly a case that is as complex and as
hard fought as this case is.

So I don't think you can -- I really don't think you can ever be thwarted from taking discovery that you got properly noticed inside the time period. I think your order would take effect if you tried something outside the time period.

But in this case, even if we assume that in your mind the question is, why couldn't you have done these a little bit earlier, I don't think it's necessarily the right question, but even if we address those, there were -- there are a couple things that happened here. One is, just a few days before the discovery cutoff, IBM produced to us, and without getting into the reasons because I'm sure both of us will probably blame each other for this, but we received approximately 340,000 documents a couple days before the

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 discovery cutoff. Well, it's hard to believe that that late in the process we can receive which what are relevant documents, and Mr. Shaughnessy may get up here and tell you, well, we don't think they're relevant, but we turned them over. But the standard is you're turning over relevant documents. We believe they were relevant. It would be hard to believe that you can't take any discovery on those simply because a party thwarted the discovery that you fought long and hard for, in some cases over a year, they turned over a couple days before the discovery period.

THE COURT: But didn't you say that you had known about, been in discussions with the representatives of the deponents as early as November?

MR. HATCH: Yes.

THE COURT: So, you know, where does that leave you? It's not as though you weren't on notice that these were individuals who needed to be deposed in advance of the cutoff time.

MR. HATCH: I understand that. And like I said, we noticed them in advance of the cutoff period. But what you're saying is, we're trying -- you're asking us to apply policies that would be truly, would truly penalize people who try to conduct discovery in a humane manner, because we contacted them and said -- and tried to work this out. And when we finally run out of time working with them, we get the notices

on records so that we can get those depositions taken. If we can't do that in discovery, have discussions with the other party and attempt to work these things out, which, again, in Mr. Wagner's brief, that's one of the things he complained about. And I think he probably was not aware of, because he's counsel that just came into the case lately, that these discussions were going on. But you remember he discussed in his brief in the Northern District you have a responsibility to try to work it out with the other party.

. We understand that. We're supposed to do that here. It's just a matter of common courtesy. And I find it hard to believe that the Court would penalize us for trying to work something out with the other side before going full blown. If we had just filed something there, and Mr. Wagner surely would have said, well, under Northern District you haven't tried to work it out.

So we proceed under the rules as we understand them. And I think, you know, one way or another, you know, I don't think we can get penalized for doing what I think we're supposed to do.

And so under that regard, I think it would be -you know, and I think the important thing here, Your Honor, is
no party has really come to you, at least in the briefs, and
said that the information they sought isn't relevant and
isn't, in fact, highly relevant. As a matter of fact, as Your

Honor knows, the parties did have to come to the Court and seek an opportunity to do additional depositions than were originally asked for in the case, and that was granted. Part of that was because the complex nature of the case and a number of issues that had to come before Your Honor. But as a result of that, there's no question, some of those depositions were taken a little later in the game.

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And I will point out that one of those,

Mr. Palmisano, who was just taken in January, there were
issues that came out in that case that were important in his
deposition. Now, that's just at the same time that these
subpoenas were being filed that are relevant to Intel and
extremely relevant to Intel. Also, these documents we talked
about in the brief, starting with UDG-PI, those only came out
in the last month or two.

So a lot of these issues are issues because of documents produced and because of information that has been obtained from depositions that came later in the game. And Mr. Palmisano, as you know, his deposition came later in the game because of hard-fought motions in this court to allow us to take it and was -- we were not able to take that until later in the game.

And so now, so that we can take the deposition on issues that came out later in the game, we would be truly prejudiced if it was said, well, you should have taken it

earlier in the game, when we couldn't have asked about these things that we know about now. And that's why some parties pick some depositions to come later than others. And I would put to you that if it wasn't Intel and Open Group and Oracle, it would have been someone else, because there is always some depositions that come at the end of the game by definition.

So I would ask Your Honor to grant our motion, to be able to take these depositions that were noticed. They were put on notice, they had adequate notice, more than 15 days, before the discovery cutoff period. I think one of the reasons we filed the motion in kind of the odd way we did is because we understood that at some level this issue will need to be addressed in the Northern District of California by Magistrate Judge Zimmerman, who I've been in front of in another case and is a very competent judge. But I think he will be looking in large part for your guidance today, as well, for his ruling. Thank you very much.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Hatch.

Mr. Shaughnessy?

MR. SHAUGHNESSY: Thank you, Your Honor.

I need to, since Mr. Hatch mentioned this issue during his argument, I do need to inform the Court, with respect to the documents that Mr. Hatch seems to be suggesting were produced to them right on the eve of the close of discovery, what Mr. Hatch neglected to tell the Court is that

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SCO served upon IBM a document request, the return date for which was, in fact, the day after discovery. So we were producing documents in response to a document request timely. There were also additional documents that were produced that are the subject of the other motion that you will hear today. So I don't want the Court to be left with the impression that we have somehow waited until the last minute to dump a bunch of materials on SCO that it should not have been expecting to be receiving by the time.

With respect to the motion that's before the Court now, Your Honor, SCO in its opening memo, very short brief, it said that it served each of these three companies with subpoenas requiring them to appear for depositions, but the companies, quote, simply and improperly decline to do so.

That, Your Honor, is not true. SCO did not, and it now acknowledges begrudgingly in its reply and Mr. Hatch has now acknowledged before you, it did not properly serve these companies. Now Intel, as I think is clear from its brief, filed this brief precisely because the memorandum that SCO filed in this case suggested pretty strongly that Intel and Oracle and the Open Group had simply snubbed their nose at a court order. Now, if I were representing Intel, I would have done the same thing. I would have felt it important to make sure that you understand that that is not, in fact, the case.

Your Honor, it is undisputed that these defendants

were not served with a proper subpoena until the afternoon of January 26th. That subpoena required, purported to require these defendants to produce documents, apparently substantial volumes of documents, to prepare a 30(b)6 witness or series of witnesses to testify, and to do all of that by 9:00 a.m. the next morning. That, Your Honor, under any standard, under any standard of the amount of time that is reasonable to give notice of a subpoena is flawed. And I think Mr. Hatch would agree with that.

And that is why, Your Honor, that SCO really doesn't at the end of the day contend that the subpoenas that they served on January 26th for a deposition on January 27th were operative or they required any of these defendants to appear. Instead what SCO argues is that they sent a flurry of paper to these defendants earlier in the month, none of which was proper subpoenaed, none of which remotely complied with any of the requirements of the rules, and that that somehow served as a place holder. That sending out a flurry of paper not complying with the rules is now a place holder. And that allows SCO to wait until the day before the deposition to actually and properly serve these defendants.

Now, Your Honor, I do not represent Intel, I don't represent Oracle, and I don't represent Open Group. And I do not purport to speak on their behalf, and I do not purport to raise the arguments and the objections that they may have to

these subpoenas. They will, if they determine it necessary to do so, should Your Honor allow these depositions to proceed, they will raise those issues before you or before the court that issued these subpoenas.

But it is abundantly clear, Your Honor, that the subpoenas or the purported subpoenas that were sent were not remotely close to complying with the rules. These are not technical defects, as Mr. Hatch characterizes them. These are the most fundemental defects that you can possibly have in a subpoena. Fundamentally, a subpoena at its most basic level has to tell you, the recipient of the subpoena, who it is that is supposed to testify; what documents, if you're supposed to produce documents, are they; and where the person is supposed to be. Where am I supposed to go for this deposition?

Each and every one of these subpoenas failed on each and every one of those fronts. SCO served subpoenas that required the production of documents with nothing attached to those subpoenas to indicate what documents were required. SCO served subpoenas requiring parties to designate witnesses to testify on topics without identifying what those topics were. SCO served subpoenas requiring the witnesses in Northern California to travel 2000 miles to New York. Rule 45 says that a subpoena, quote, shall be quashed if it requires travel of more than 100 miles.

For that reason alone, Your Honor, each and every

one of these subpoenas was invalid. It's not a technical defect. That is a requirement of the rules. SCO knows the rules. It had the ability to comply with the rules. It simply chose not to do so.

But that's not all. SCO served these notices by fax. The rules require, the cases uniformly require you cannot serve a subpoena by fax. You have to personally serve a subpoena. There's no exception to that rule. That's not a technical defect. That is the fundamental rule.

SCO sent faxes to the, quote, legal department of these various companies. That's not service, Your Honor. These are large companies. When you send something to the legal department or you send something to somewhere else, who knows where it's going to go? The requirement is you serve the subpoena, that the subpoena tells you what it is you have to do, and you serve that subpoena on the registered agent, because these companies have procedures, so that they know, okay, we've got a subpoena. Here's what we need to do with it. You simply can't send a flurry of faxes to any possible person in the company and then somehow expect that these companies are supposed to comply.

The problems, Your Honor, didn't end there. Two of the subpoenas that were issued from the Northern -- two of the subpoenas were issued from the Northern District of California. The local rules in the Northern District of

California require SCO to meet and confer after the service of the subpoena with respect to the scheduling of the deposition. SCO was required to comply with the rules of the Northern District of California. According to the papers that have been filed by Intel in this case and by Oracle in the motion that it's filed in the Northern District of California, SCO made no effort, no effort to comply with that rule.

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And the subpoenas failed to include witness fees.

Now, Mr. Hatch says this is a technical defect, that nobody should really worry about. But that's not what the
Ninth Circuit says. The Ninth Circuit has held that failing
to include a witness fee is grounds for quashing a subpoena,
period. That's not a technical defect.

But more importantly, Your Honor, this doesn't occur on a blank slate, as Your Honor correctly pointed out.

SCO has had two and a half years to take these depositions.

SCO has identified these companies in discovery responses more than a year ago. And most importantly, as Your Honor pointed out, you could not have made it clearer to SCO what it was that they were required to do should they desire to take these depositions.

And finally, Your Honor, we believe, as we've indicated in our papers, that the taking of these depositions is, in fact, precisely that, that what SCO is asking the Court to do is to essentially lift -- to modify the scheduling order

to allow them to take depositions, that they could have and should have taken prior to the cutoff.

But beyond that, Your Honor, we had a conversation with SCO, which Mr. Hatch alludes to, with regard to a couple of these depositions. We were told by SCO that the two depositions that were at issue, Mr. Messman and Mr. Chatlos, that those were unique circumstances, those individuals were truly unavailable, and that this, we understood, was it. These were the only witnesses we were going to see who were going to come after cutoff.

The Court granted -- we did not oppose the motion.

We said we would not oppose the motion. We made it clear to

SCO, however, that we believed the Court's order required them

to get your permission to do that. But we said we wouldn't

oppose the motion, if those were the conditions.

Well, that's not what happened, because six days later in a telephone conference with Your Honor and myself and other counsel, they suddenly bring up five more depositions that they want to take.

Your Honor, it is abundantly clear to me that SCO had the ability, they had the resources, they have the sophisticated legal counsel who knows the rules, who knows what to do, and they simply chose not to do it. And they simply chose instead to impose the burdens on these third parties. And I think Your Honor should not allow the

depositions to proceed on that basis.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Shaughnessy.

Mr. Hatch, did you want to respond?

MR. HATCH: Yes. I'm not clear whether you'll allow Mr. Wagner to argue at all for Intel. I prefer to go after him, if you are. But I think Mr. Shaughnessy has made his argument. It should have been one or the other.

THE COURT: Do either counsel object?

MR. SHAUGHNESSY: I have no objection, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right, then. If you want to speak, go ahead.

MR. MARKS: Thank you, Your Honor. I appreciate the opportunity to appear here. I'm Anthony Marks, and I represent Intel Corporation.

Intel felt compelled to respond to the motion that was filed even though in most senses they really have no dog in the fight. And they felt compelled to do that because they were accused of being a bad corporate citizen and unfair litigant. Whatever degree of that took place before has been amplified today. The notion has been made that Intel conspired in a sense to thwart the discovery in this case by raising unfair objections. And I'm not sure whom Intel is alleged to conspired with, but there is a suggestion that Intel has done something unfair and improper.

Intel takes its reputation as a good corporate

citizen, as a fair litigant whether it's a third party,
whether it's a plaintiff or defendant, very serious. So those
charges are very serious and warrants some discussion.

The notion that -- there's a bit of blaming the victim here. The notion that all of these things happened beyond my client's control, I heard SCO's lawyer say. There wasn't much that happened as far as Intel is concerned that was beyond SCO counsel's control.

I have a timeline, if I may approach. I don't really wish to discuss it much, but if I may hand that.

THE COURT: Have you provided copies to counsel?

MR. MARKS: I will. I have copies for all.

Your Honor, I'm not going to talk about this in detail. But the salient point, which SCO's counsel has acknowledged already, is that no effective subpoena of Intel was served until the afternoon before the deposition was to take place.

The notion that it was beyond SCO's control is really quite simply false. First of all, the timing of the service. The various defects that were made during the course of the subpoena proceedings were as a matter of law not to render the subpoenas a nullity. Intel responded not only promptly but early to the original thing that had been faxed to Intel was not, in fact, a subpoena at all and told SCO's counsel that there were some defects that they needed to

remedy. Notwithstanding that, SCO's counsel chose to wait five days before attempting to correct that and then not correcting even all of the issues that had been identified in it.

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So that brought us to the 25th January. Here we are two days before the deposition, still defects. We promptly, I personally on behalf of Intel notified SCO's counsel that there were still errors. They served another subpoena on the afternoon of the 26th.

I will avow to the Court that I was unaware of the Court's order. I knew that there was a discovery cutoff because SCO's lawyer had told me that. So I was aware that there was a discovery cutoff, but I had no idea about your order. There's some suggestion here that I or Intel has tried to take advantage of the Court's order. Other than being aware that there was a discovery cutoff because SCO's lawyer mentioned it, we were unaware of that.

So we know that there was no valid subpoena served. There's some discussion in the timeline about the many defects in this. So the notion that these are beyond SCO's control is really quite simply false. Not only were they within SCO's control, but Intel told them specifically what the issues were and how to fix them.

Second, let's assume for the sake of argument about this notion of notice and that notice would have been

effective. The cases don't, in fact, say that. The cases deal typically with subpoenas for a single deposition and for documents, or in some cases -- I can't recall whether any cases like this or for both. But they are not, as was this particular subpoena, calling for a deposition on six enumerated topics, which in turn had several subsections to them.

I also had -- I apologize for not knowing this.

But I have the document requests and the scheme of topics.

Does the Court have that in its file?

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. MARKS: All right. Suffice it to say that Intel has investigated and determined that somewhere between three and nine Intel employees would need to be deposed to respond appropriately to the 30(b)6 notice that was served on Intel, and I don't think we determined how many people would need to be searched, but it would probably be somewhat more than 10. So this is not a small imposition on Intel. This is a significant Intel imposition.

Add to that to the fact, and there was some discussion to this and I want to come back to it, the fact that there have been two previous subpoenas served on Intel by SCO, one by IBM. Mr. Hatch I think inadvertently suggested that there had been some discussion with SCO's counsel about this subpoena as much as 30 or 45 days before.

In fact, that's not true. I am the lawyer who has represented Intel during the course of the last subpoena, and the discussion that was held related to a different subpoena that asked for a discrete subset of documents and upon which Intel responded 30 to 45 days earlier. There has been no discussion about this particular set of topics. The time the deposition would take place, the time for compliance, et cetera, nothing of substance has ever been communicated on that subject until after the subpoenas were served and, indeed, after the motion was brought.

THE COURT: Mr. Marks, let me just ask you because I haven't noticed. Are you officed locally?

MR. MARKS: No, I'm not. I'm officed in Arizona.

THE COURT: Where?

MR. MARKS: Arizona.

THE COURT: Arizona.

MR. MARKS: So it's important to understand that there has not been discussion about these very matters. But it is also important to understand that Intel's presence could not have possibly gone unnoticed to the SCO lawyers, having served two subpoenas on them, or IBM's lawyers who have served one.

It is also important, as I suggested, to look at the topics for deposition and topics for documents. They include such topics as, all of Intel's communications with

SCO. All of Intel's communications with IBM. It can't possibly have escaped -- if that was the subject that really needed discovery, it could not have possibly escaped the attention of fine counsel that SCO have that they ought to have discovery on that. I don't know whether it is or is not relevant. I don't know enough about the underlying case. But I do know that it would not possibly -- that's not the sort of topic that comes up the last minute.

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So the two points that I, the first of which I think we talked about and has not been disputed is the notion that there was no valid subpoena. The Ninth Circuit law and the law of other circuits recognizes that absent a valid subpoena which includes personal service, which includes a witness fee, which includes that there be a subpoena as opposed to just a deposition notice if you're a third party, a third party has no obligation to respond.

Notwithstanding that, Intel responded, told SCO the problem, and they didn't fix it, and they didn't fix it until the afternoon before. Intel obviously couldn't produce the half dozen witnesses and all of those documents the next day.

More important, even if one regards the original subpoena, which, in fact, is a notice and not a subpoena, as notice in some sense of the word, in two weeks allotted for that, Intel could not have possibly complied with, certainly not by the date in time required by Your Honor's order by the

discovery cutoff. SCO should presumably have noticed that by the breadth of the topics they raise.

So I'll close by suggesting there really is a problem. I dealt with -- it doesn't sound like a very glamorous job, but one of the things I do as Intel's counsel from time to time is deal with subpoenas, and I've noticed a habit on those third-party subpoenas somebody sends a brand-new lawyer fresh out of law school down to the library to draft a whole bunch of third-party subpoenas and sends them out to third parties without giving any thought to what is required in the case, what sort of an imposition they're imposing on third parties, what the discovery deadlines are, et cetera.

That seems to have happened here, because if you look at the topics, they're so terribly broad that no one could reasonably have expected them to comply in two weeks.

The second part of the theme that is consistent with that is the notion that -- I have mis-served subpoenas or made those technical errors myself. But there were a really large number of them here. And notwithstanding receiving a gratuitous road map from Intel that says, you need to do this to fix it, it never happened.

So the reason Intel decided to file a brief and send me up here and spend their money dealing with this is not because they have a dog in this fight and not because they

side with IBM or they side with SCO or they care about those sorts of issues, they decided to spend that money because they had been impugned, and it was bad enough in the briefs. It was frankly offensive to me here today.

The notion that Intel is somehow conspiring to thwart discovery is simply false, and the record certainly reflects that. I appreciate it.

THE COURT: Thank you for your comments, Mr. Marks.

MR. HATCH: Thank you, Your Honor.

A couple points were raised by both astute counsel for both of the parties. First I would point out that the timeline produced by Intel is somewhat significant to me. It shows a couple things. As you'll notice, this isn't the first time we've had issues with Intel. You'll notice from his own timeline, he talks about documents that were being subpoenaed in November of 2004. We had ongoing discussions with them including discussions between senior officials of the two companies to try to get them to comply with that subpoena and do what we needed to do.

And you'll notice by their own timeline they had not produced documents to us even to our second subpoena, which I think is the first, as well, until, let's see, December 20th of 2005, nearly a year later.

You'll also notice that even IBM was subpoening documents from them in January of 2005. And Mr. Shaughnessy

just got up and said, why couldn't we have done this a lot earlier? I could say the same thing to them. But I assume -- I didn't accuse them of that because I assume, like us, as discovery went forth, things became understandable it was relevant information that was required from Intel as late as that period of time. And I think we have the right every bit as much as IBM did to get discovery as late a period it becomes obvious that they had relevant discovery to give us.

Secondly, I would note that neither counsel addressed the case law that we addressed. As I indicated in my opening argument, we were the only party who cited case law that was to the effect that the issue here is not -- for the Court is not technical compliance, but it is notice to the party. And neither of them cited another case, and neither of them addressed those cases.

And let me -- one of the reason I think why is particularly if you look at the, just as an example, look at the Kupritz case. In that case, the lawyers really messed up big in that case. They first -- they filed a subpoena in the Southern District of Georgia when the guy was actually residing in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. So they completely missed the right court. Eventually when they got it corrected, they served the subpoena not the day before, but they served it 15 minutes after the scheduled deposition time was to start, which under any circumstances would be certainly

worse than the day before.

And the Court gave the following -- essentially the analysis was the following five points. They found the subpoena adequate on the following grounds. One, that the deponent was fully aware of the scheduled deposition.

Well, neither IBM nor Intel have argued that they weren't aware of the date. They're complaining about, you know, some of the technical details, but they don't say they weren't aware that they had been noticed up for January 27th of 2006.

THE COURT: They had 12 or 14 hours notice, something like that.

MR. HATCH: Oh, no. Of that point -- they had notice as of January 12th of that point. That, I think, is a very significant issue. That's the difference between why the Court focuses on what's the notice, not the actual technical detail.

THE COURT: I understand.

MR. HATCH: And so I always have to look at the Kupritz court. They said, just as here, they had actual notice of when it was going to take place.

The second point in Kupritz, never indicated there was a change to the schedule date. There wasn't any here, either. There was ample time to prepare for the deposition. Here in this district, 15 days is presumed that. But we

certainly -- you know, it wasn't the day that they

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represented. They had notice of the topics since the 12th, at least.

And I would point out, Your Honor, that I think Mr. Shaughnessy got his facts just a little wrong. He said that the subpoenas were faxed. The subpoenas were actually served by process servers. It was the deposition notices that were faxed. But they had those with the topics as early as the 12th or 13th, as well. So they had plenty of time and notice of that.

What I referred to, I think -- I misplaced -- here it is. When they said they didn't know the topics, until January 12th they didn't know the topics, I didn't specifically say, as counsel for Intel indicated, that they had had specific discussions about the depositions. I just quoted their exact language out of the brief. It says:

SCO's counsel had dealt with specific Intel outside counsel on these very matters.

In other words, they just got done talking about being faxed the deposition notice with what was going to happen at the deposition.

And then he says that they dealt with these very matters at least 45 days earlier. Now, the reason he's trying to split a hair is because the deposition notice had the same matters as we had been discussing on document productions and

other things. The general topic areas are the same. One is a document production, and one is a request for actual people to show up and give deposition testimony. So they've been aware of this for a long period of time.

As the Eastern District said, there was no motion in that case to quash ever filed in any court. Intel never filed a motion to quash in the Northern District. They sent us an objection. That is an important factor in the Eastern District.

And the second subpoena corrected the possible defects. And then the Court went on to say, he said:

That subpoens was valid as to issuance and service. There was not a timely motion to quash.

If there was, the only problem is whether the subpoens served at 1:45 p.m. for a deposition to commence at 1:30 p.m. on the same day is unreasonable as to notice.

In other words, he's looking at the issue the way a court does, and reasonable notice, not the technicalities.

He said:

Ordinarily, of course, it would be self-evident that it failed to provide adequate notice. Here, however, there was no question that Mr. Lowry had such prior notice by the defective subpoena. He had adequate notice by the defective subpoena served on

January 3rd, 1994, and by the communications with counsel. He could have complied, albeit he might have been a few minutes late. Instead of complying, he filed as promptly as possible on the same day, a motion to quash.

So in this case, he filed a motion to quash. We didn't even have that here. So they didn't address the case law because the case law is not good for them because they actually had adequate notice. And instead of dealing with the substance of the discovery request, they choose to fight on technical grounds.

Now, it's interesting to me to hear Intel coming in here and complain about the discovery cutoff date because that's not particularly relevant as to them. To them, it should be only, we're going to have to produce witnesses, and when will we do it? But instead of coming to us and saying, look, we might need a little more than 15 days, they did not cooperate with us one iota. They didn't say, we're going to need, like they have today in front of Your Honor, three to nine people. They just said, no, you've got technical problems. You've got a cutoff date. So bad; so sad. And that is not the way it ought to have worked.

And we would have certainly have accommodated them.

IBM has shown it's willing to accommodate witnesses that for whatever reason were not able to appear before the cutoff

date, because that's what we did when their own witnesses couldn't show up before, and that's what we did when Novell witnesses couldn't show up before.

So I would put to Your Honor that the objections raised by IBM and Intel are not sufficient to keep us from getting what is really relevant discovery, and that we should be allowed to take these three depositions. And we're willing to work with them and with IBM on an appropriate time to take those.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Hatch.

MR. HATCH: Thank you very much.

THE COURT: Counsel, I'm prepared to rule in this matter.

Looking at this case individually on its particular set of facts, I find that the subpoenas on January 26th gave inadequate notice and also gave inadequate time for the deponents to prepare.

I find that the subpoenas of January 12th were defective both in substance and service and would have constituted, even if not technically defective, would have also likely provided inadequate notice in time to prepare.

I also note and find that the parties failed to comply -- or SCO failed to comply with the meet-and-confer requirement of the Northern District of California.

And finally, I find and will deny the motion of SCO

to allow these additional depositions, finding that the requirements of the October 12th order were clear and could not -- or were not the subject of unilateral decisions to violate. It was clear. It said, to the extent that such depositions could not be completed within that period of time, they must be foregone.

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And SCO should have noticed them up earlier and at minimum overseen the preparation of those subpoenas such that the argument would be that they were effective on January 12th. Nonetheless, they weren't.

So that would be the ruling. And, Mr. Shaughnessy, if you'll prepare an order as to that decision.

MR. SHAUGHNESSY: I will, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Now let's address the remaining motion, which is the motion to compel. This is also SCO's motion.

As I indicated -- Mr. McBride, let me ask you, please, to pay attention here. I know you need to speak, but it's distracting and it keeps us from moving forward.

Mr. Hatch, this is SCO's motion. As I indicated at the bench before we began, I have some preliminary types of questions that I would like to pose. They may address various portions of the motion, but let me pose them first, and then you may address them and make your argument.

MR. HATCH: I'll be happy to. Mr. James was going

to handle this part of this, but if you want to address questions to me, I'll make an attempt, as well.

THE COURT: No, that's fine. I didn't know who was going to handle them. Mr. James, if you're willing to, I will do that. Do you want me to pose those questions now?

MR. JAMES: If that's Your Honor's preference, sure.

THE COURT: All right. First, I'm on notice that and it's been acknowledged today that IBM has made a recent discovery production. I want to know what impact that particular production may have on these motions to compel. In other words, has it resolved anything? All right?

Specifically, what specific items is SCO still seeking, and why do you need them?

Noting that at the outset of this case or prior to its filing, it was expressed to the media and others that SCO possessed evidence regarding the misappropriation of source code. At this point, don't you have enough evidence to go forward in that regard or, to be candid about it, does it constitute fishing at this point?

If I were to grant your motion to compel, what would be the effect upon the scheduling deadlines in this case?

And then finally, if you will address in more detail what information you have regarding the location in

North Carolina that you allege houses pre-1991 AIX source code.

With those questions in mind, Mr. James, go ahead.

MR. JAMES: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. And I'll
do the best I can to respond to your questions. I'm going to
try and weave my answers to those questions into --

THE COURT: I don't mean to mess up your argument as you may have prepared for it, as long as you address those questions at some point.

MR. JAMES: Thank you, Your Honor. And I appreciate that.

There's been a suggestion that I heard for the first time when counsel for IBM addressed the Court that 340,000 documents that have been produced were produced as a result of a recent document request served by SCO on IBM. And I find that to be a very, very curious assertion, Your Honor. And the reason for that is you will see that we filed our motion to compel on, I believe it was December 29th.

And if you look at the specific requests that we address in that, you will see, Your Honor, that many of the document requests for which we contend there has been insufficient production dated back some into 2004, others in 2005. And you'll see in our memorandum, in particular our opening memorandum, that we address those dates or gave those dates to Your Honor. And so the suggestion I think to the

extent it was intended to indicate that all of these documents were suddenly produced this late in response to or because of a very recent document request is just unfair and inaccurate.

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Now, Your Honor has asked, what impact does the production have? And we do believe it moots many of the issues. We're still attempting to complete our review of those documents, however. And, in fact, IBM has represented in its briefing that there will be additional documents forthcoming in response to requests that we have made.

Therefore, it's a little bit difficult for me to stand before Your Honor right now and tell you specifically what has been mooted because that process of reviewing the 340,000 documents, while it has been a very intense and aggressive process on our part, is not completed. And we are expecting additional documents. But I think quite clearly a number of the issues have been mooted.

And I guess, Your Honor, what I can say best in that regard is while we hope not the need to come back on many of the issues, there is some chance we may need to re-address some more narrow issues based on when we're able to conclude our document review. There were a few areas where we still are very concerned. And based on the review that we've been able to do, we believe that the document production is not complete.

And, in fact, there has been some ongoing

correspondence recently between counsel in an effort to kind of sort out what's still left in light of the recent production. We have identified just recently several areas that we think are still at issue that have not been produced, and we've identified those to IBM. Those include IBM's global market view database as it pertains to Linux and Unix. IBM's, it's either FIWC or FIW-C database as it pertains to AIX.

IBM's IBC service tracker and documents evidencing the Linux related financial materials that were copied to IBM senior executives.

We think these documents, Your Honor, and this in part I think goes in answer to the second question you asked relating to evidence of misappropriation, many of these documents, we believe, goes to the damages issue as opposed to evidence of misappropriation. My understanding, and I'll represent to the Court, is, yes, we do have evidence of misappropriation of the source code.

I would say, though, in that regard that irrespective of what quantity of evidence we may have or may not have in that regard, to the extent there are relevant documents in IBM's possession or control that go to that issue that have been requested and not produced, they ought to be produced because those are the rules of the game. And there never comes a point, to my knowledge, in litigation where the Court or a party says, you now have an enough. You don't need

any more, irrespective of whether the opposing party has additional information or documents in that regard.

But again, Your Honor, many of the documents at issue are damage-related documents that are unrelated to misappropriation, although I'm going to talk a little bit about misappropriation issues, a couple of issues still. And so hopefully I've at least somewhat answered a couple of the questions that Your Honor has asked.

We've talked about the Project Monterey. You've heard about that, and we've talked about it. And IBM has now come back and represented, as far as we can tell, that they've given us everything. We're still reviewing the documents. And if they've given us everything, then that's all we can expect.

Again, however, we may be back, Your Honor, after we complete our review and based on our review saying to Your Honor, based on what we have found, we still think there's this area missing. We hope that's not the case. But certainly that issue has been narrowed. And IBM has made representations that they believe they've now produced everything within their possession and control on Project Monterey. That's my understanding of it now.

With respect to documents predating 2001, let me talk about that for a minute, because IBM has objected routinely and imposed a 2001 deadline for producing documents.

And you'll see, Your Honor, we address that on Page 6 of our reply memo. It's unclear to us where that 2001 deadline comes from and why IBM feels it has the right to unilaterally impose that deadline on us. In fact, our contentions are that IBM's activities in breach of their agreements with SCO date back before 2001 into the 1998 time frame.

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In addition, you may recall that IBM is basically in its counterclaim in this case asked the Court for a clean bill of health with respect to all of its conduct relating to Linux activities. Therefore, if there are Linux activities of IBM that predate 2001 and IBM has documents that are responsive to the documents we've asked for before 2001, they ought to produce those documents.

Yet, IBM has routinely objected to the documents saying that before 2001 for whatever reason that we don't understand, the claim is irrelevant. And we don't think that's appropriate. And if they have pre-2001 documents, they ought to produce those documents relating to IBM's plans and efforts to market, promote or advertise Linux-related products and services.

So we think that is still an issue that's out there, although again, we're continuing to review the documents, and we're near completing that. And if there are more specific areas, then we'll certainly call those to Your Honor's attention.

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Let me talk about the AIX versions prior to 1990, and I think this is the area where Your Honor was referring with respect to the location in North Carolina. IBM has told us that they have now produced everything they have and that they can't find certain pre-1990 AIX related documents.

And our position in that regard is if IBM has now looked everywhere that they know of to look and looked in areas where we've suggested that they look and are representing to the Court that they don't have anything, then we accept that representation. But we want to be absolutely clear that that is IBM's position, that, in fact, they have looked everywhere reasonable that both we've suggested and they've suggested and that there are no more documents responsive in that regard.

Again, we've been quite surprised that we get 340,000 documents this late in the game, many of which, even according to IBM's contentions, moot our motion to compel.

And they clearly do.

THE COURT: Well, that raises this question, and maybe I should have asked it sooner. Based upon that, should this hearing be continued until such time as you have had the opportunity to review those documents so that we can narrow the issues and aren't wasting people's time today?

MR. JAMES: The answer to your question in my opinion is yes. However, we didn't feel like we were in the

position, Your Honor, to ask for that continuance because we were concerned that IBM would come and say the deadline is over. You should have asked for this and done this sooner and you didn't. And, therefore, you've lost the opportunity.

But I think you're absolutely right.

THE COURT: Well, let me ask Mr. Shaughnessy and Mr. Drake to respond to that right now because there's no point in us going forward.

MR. SHAUGHNESSY: Your Honor, respectfully, I think this motion needs to be denied. I will --

THE COURT: The motion to compel?

MR. SHAUGHNESSY: The motion to compel needs to be denied.

THE COURT: Well, I understand --

MR. SHAUGHNESSY: We don't need to have another hearing after they've had more time to look at the documents. They have had plenty of time.

THE COURT: When were those documents produced?

MR. SHAUGHNESSY: I'm not sure exactly what
documents counsel is referring to.

MR. JAMES: The 340,000 that you just produced.

THE COURT: The 340,000.

MR. SHAUGHNESSY: We produced, and I'm prepared to explain to you in detail, the financial information that apparently Mr. James is referring to and the two depositions

that they took with respect to that financial information and the follow-up information that we provided in response to their requests and the further information we provided as early as Tuesday of this week and my conversation with Mr. Normand yesterday on this very subject. There's nothing to produce.

THE COURT: I want to be fair about this and hear from both sides. So, Mr. James, go ahead.

MR. JAMES: Okay. Let me now just address, if I could, Your Honor, and this is an area where we do not believe documents have been produced based on what we've been able to see and do so far, and that is we had requested that IBM produce documents and, in fact, a witness relating to IBM's interpretation of language used in AIX and Dynix licenses. IBM's response has been, well, you can read those licenses. You don't need to have anyone from our side testify and tell you what we think those mean.

The reason those are important, Your Honor, is because much or at least some of the critical language in the AIX and Dynix licenses of IBM is very similar to the language in the SCO licenses that are at the heart of this case. And we have made a request through letter to IBM stating, IBM, if it is your position that the language of your contracts is clear and unambiguous and can be interpreted as a matter of law by the Court, fine, we accept that.

Not surprising, IBM has not been willing to acknowledge that that is the case. And we believe, Your Honor, that we are entitled to have IBM's evidence on what the language in their licenses that is very similar to the language in the license in our case how they interpret that language and what it means. It's clear relevant, yet IBM stonewalls and refuses to produce anyone and says it is not relevant. And that is just untrue. And I do not understand how a party can claim that the language at issue in a license agreement of their own that is very similar to the language at issue in this case is irrelevant when we ask them how they interpret that language.

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Finally, let me just address briefly the

Chicago 7 issue. Chicago 7 is a group of seven companies.

They call it the Chicago 7 because they met in Chicago. We received some documentation from IBM that very strongly suggested that these were a group of companies dealing with Linux and, in fact, that were talking about sponsoring a company that would compete against SCO.

When we asked for a 30(b)6 deposition on that subject, they agreed to produce a witness. They did produce a witness, Karen Smith. However, IBM unilaterally limited her deposition or narrowed her deposition to IBM's definition of the topic and absolutely refused to allow Karen Smith to testify or answer questions that went to our designation and

that went beyond the limited designation that IBM had provided.

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IBM does not have the right, Your Honor, to unilaterally narrow or change our deposition topics. And moreover, in the context of a deposition, an attorney does not have -- it is improper to instruct a witness not to answer based on the fact that allegedly the testimony being requested goes beyond the narrowed subject provided by the firm or the company that's being deposed.

And in this case, that's exactly what happened.

And we ought to have the right, Your Honor, to get the

documents and take whatever testimony is appropriate based on

our designation of the subject matter from a Chicago 7

witness, and that has not happened. And so that is still an

issue that remains.

Under the circumstances, it's a little difficult, as I indicated, to tell you specifically what remains because we're still reviewing the documents. And I agree if Your Honor is suggesting we ought to be back that we can do this more quickly and narrow it some. But based on those --

THE COURT: Answer the question, Mr. James, about how long it would take you.

MR. JAMES: To complete? I think within a couple more weeks we're done on our review.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

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MR. SHAUGHNESSY: Did Your Honor have questions,

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specific questions that you want me to address?

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THE COURT: I do.

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MR. SHAUGHNESSY: Okay.

THE COURT: You allege that much of SCO's, motion

Second question. When IBM renews its summary

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relating to the 30(b)6 testimony is moot. What witnesses have been designated, what topics have they been designated on and

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when are the deposition dates?

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judgment motion, is there any information which has not yet

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been provided to SCO that IBM will use in support of its motion? For example, let's say IBM does not produce any

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documents related to IBM customers who migrated to Linux from

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other operating systems. Is IBM, therefore, going to point to

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SCO's failure to analyze this type of market information in

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its support of summary judgment? Obviously what I don't want

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is either side to use information that has been withheld in

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case at trial, all evidence needing to be on the table for the

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other party to analyze and take a look at.

Will IBM file an affidavit stating that they will

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not use information that has not been provided to SCO in

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support of its motion for summary judgment or at trial?

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Third question. Previously I ordered IBM to

produce all versions and changes to AIX and Dynix. This included the code found within the CMVC and RCS system. But does IBM have a depository containing pre-1991 AIX source code anywhere else? This goes to that issue of a possible location in North Carolina. In other words, is IBM prepared to file an affidavit saying it's produced all versions and changes to AIX and Dynix pursuant to this Court's order, whether or not the code is found in CMVC or RCS?

Fourth, IBM recently subpoenaed Hewlitt-Packard,
Sun, Microsoft and Baystar Capital. How does the information
that you are seeking from these parties differ from SCO's
request for testimony to test the credibility of IBM's
interpretation of the Unix license? Aren't you seeking to
test the licenses between those entities in the hopes to
defend its own licensing activities from SCO?

And those are the questions posed.

MR. SHAUGHNESSY: Thank you. Thank you, Your Honor. That is helpful.

I think what I'd like to do, Your Honor, if I may, is give you a little bit of background on what I think is the big issue that is before the Court, and that has to do with the financial information that SCO has requested and that IBM has produced that I really think is at the heart of this motion, at least of the motion that was originally filed.

Your Honor, IBM spent months, literally months

collecting documents regarding IBM's revenue, expenses and profits for AIX, Dynix and Linux. That is the heart of the motion as it was filed. And even in the reply memorandum that was filed, that is really the heart of the motion. An individual at IBM, William Sandve, headed up that effort along with a number of consultants and attorneys who are involved. Mr. Drake from my office was involved in that effort. We gathered -- Mr. Sandve himself spoke with more than 80 IBM employees to gather information and documents. We gathered documents and information from across all of IBM's brands and divisions. We gathered documents and information from a variety of IBM financial marketing databases. Mr. Sandve, consultants and others spent over 1,000 hours talking to people, collecting information, putting the documents together and putting the documents together in an organized fashion so they would be easily understandable to SCO.

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After they had been collected, we produced to SCO more than 23,000 pages of documents responsive to these requests. We produced with these 23,000 pages of documents summaries and overviews, sort of a higher level view of the information, and then all of the supporting and backup information behind all of those numbers.

We then agreed -- SCO had asked for a 30(b)6 deposition on this subject. We agreed to put up Mr. Sandve for that deposition, the purpose of which was to have

Mr. Sandve sit down and explain to SCO the information, explain to them what was there, what it means, where it came from, all those sorts of issues. We shipped sets of these documents down to Austin for Mr. Sandve's deposition. We prepare detailed summaries and indices of all of this information so that if a question was asked, you know, about P series revenue in a particular year, we would have an index with the Bates number so we could go right to that page of the document and show them exactly what it is we're talking about. Mr. Sandve himself spent 300 hours in this effort.

Mr. Sandve appeared at his deposition. Mr. Drake defended his deposition. We were prepared, Mr. Sandve was prepared to walk SCO through that information to make sure they understood it, to make sure that it was complete, to make sure that there were not things that they said that we had not produced. That was purpose of the deposition. Mr. Sandve spent an entire day with SCO's lawyers, the purpose of which was to explain to them this information.

Now, the reality, unfortunately, as it turned out is that SCO's lawyers seemed to have no interest whatsoever in the financial information of the documents. They had no interest in having him explain these documents and how they work and the indexes and everything so they would have a full, thorough understanding. And they spent all day talking about other issues. They get to the end of the day and they said,

this is unfair. You've given us all of these documents at his deposition. We haven't had time to review them.

We disagreed. We said, we think that was the purpose of this deposition, was to have this witness available so that he could explain these documents to you. But nevertheless, we'll put him up again. We'll allow you to take his deposition again. So Mr. Sandve's deposition was taken for a second day, Tuesday of this week.

Shortly before his deposition, SCO, one of the lawyers for SCO, not Mr. Hatch or Mr. James, wrote a letter to me in which they said that 24,000 pages of documents were unusable. It was too much. How in the world are they supposed to be able to understand 24,000 pages of documents? We should produce it to them in electronic form, and we should give it to them by February 17th.

On February 17th, we delivered it to them that same information, all of those documents in electronic form, exactly as they requested. They sent another letter. They said there were other issues that they thought that we needed to follow up on in connection with Mr. Sandve's deposition. We tracked those down, spent substantial amount of time doing that, tracking all of those issues down, gathering up all of this information and sending it down so that Mr. Sandve would be prepared to deal with all of these issues at his deposition earlier this week.

He spent another full day in his deposition, again prepared to walk SCO through all of this information to make sure their lawyers understood, to make sure that they understood that it was thorough, to make sure that they understood the basis and rationale, how the information was put together, how it answered all of their questions.

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Your Honor, we spent an extraordinary amount of time and money and resources in collecting this information, producing this information to them. Now I want to contrast that, if I may, Your Honor, with what we got from SCO on the same subject.

We asked SCO for similar kinds of financial documents. They delivered the documents to us, and they delivered the documents to us in electronic form. We asked for a witness, similar 30(b)6 witness, Mr. Hunsaker.

Mr. Hunsaker, it turns out, had spent less than an hour talking to other people about the subject of his testimony.

Mr. Sandve spent hundreds of hours. Mr. Hunsaker, it turned out had maybe talked to a couple people in total. Mr. Sandve personally talked to more than 80 people to prepare for his deposition.

Mr. Hunsaker's most consistent answer during his deposition was, I don't know. You really have to ask Mr. X. So when we would ask, did you talk to Mr. X about this? No, I didn't.

Your Honor, that is the contrast between the lengths to which we have gone to answer their questions as opposed to what we have gotten from SCO in return on the exact same subject.

Now, with respect to this motion and the issues before this motion, I began having conversations with Mr. Normand a week ago today on the subject of this motion, what was at issue on this motion, did we really need to have this motion, because in our view we had produced all of this information. I don't mean to disadvantage Mr. James because he was not involved in those calls. But we started having those conversations. And we had those conversations precisely because I needed to understand from him what was at issue. Why are we appearing at this hearing on Friday? What's at issue? Tell me what it is that you claim that we haven't produced.

We had conversations every couple of days on this subject, and every couple of days the answer was, I don't know. The last time we spoke was yesterday morning. We had the same conversation again. I asked Mr. Normand, why are we appearing at this hearing? We walked through their reply memorandum category by category by category by category. I explained to Mr. Normand how we had responded, how we had produced all the documents responsive to each category, how Mr. Sandve in his deposition was prepared to give SCO whatever

additional information they may need with respect to all of these categories.

And as of yesterday morning, Mr. Normand, and I posed the question to him, what's missing? Why are we appearing at this hearing tomorrow? What's missing? His answer to me yesterday morning was, I don't know. I don't know. I don't know. I don't know what it is that we're going to go before the Court tomorrow and ask Judge Wells to order. I don't know.

Now, the second reason I started having these conversations with Mr. Normand, Your Honor, was I was concerned I was going to get sandbagged at this hearing, that I was going to show up with no idea what it is that SCO was complaining about and here for a hearing for the first time that IBM has supposedly not produced. That was my other reason for having these conversations.

Mr. Normand and again an e-mail at 10 o'clock this morning.

And he identifies in this e-mail, Your Honor, these very four items that Mr. James has just mentioned in his arguments.

This e-mail is the very first time, very first time we are ever told that these items have not been produced, that these items are missing from our production, that these items are the subject of a motion to be heard the next day. And quite frankly, Your Honor, there was no attempt by counsel for SCO,

and I fault Mr. Normand, not Mr. James, there was no attempt by him despite my repeated requests to meet and confer with me about the claimed deficiencies in IBM's production.

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something, and that relates to the communication issues between counsel. We have different counsel appearing at different times. We have counsel located in different areas, and that's for both parties. And I don't have a great deal of patience with an excuse that is based upon lack of communication between parties or counsel for either side. You are expected to know what your other counsel is doing and saying. And I think that's been a problem in the past. And as I indicated, I don't have a great deal of patience with counsel who come before the Court who may not be aware of what other counsel have said or done.

MR. SHAUGHNESSY: And, Your Honor, I should tell the Court, I have a very good working relationship with Mr. Normand.

THE COURT: I'm not saying that.

MR. SHAUGHNESSY: A tremendous amount of respect for him.

THE COURT: I'm just indicating --

MR. SHAUGHNESSY: Tremendous amount of respect for these counsel.

THE COURT: -- that counsel for both sides are

expected to have communicated fully and be prepared to make representations that are known to all.

MR. SHAUGHNESSY: Okay. I appreciate that, Your Honor.

But my problem is that I have been trying for some time to find out what it is that is supposed to be the subject of this hearing so that we can intelligently address you. And I said, you know, earlier in the week, I said, look, if there are items that are not on the table, we need to let the Court know so the Court doesn't spend time reading briefs and looking at issues that aren't really ripe, that aren't really before the Court. And, you know, I understand everybody in this case, myself included, have been extraordinary busy with respect to not just these issues but any number of issues in this case.

But the bottom line, Your Honor, is that we have produced the documents that they have requested that are sufficient to tell them all of the information they need with respect to revenues, expenses and costs, the very thing that is the heart of this motion today.

THE COURT: Now, you indicated earlier that you produced documents in a timely fashion pursuant to their request for documents. When were those produced? This 340,000 page submission that we're talking about, how long ago was that produced?

MR. SHAUGHNESSY: I don't have the exact timing,
Your Honor. And I hope I was clear when I mentioned this
before. It is not my understanding, and I hope I didn't
represent to the Court, that each of those 340,000 pages were
documents that were produced in response to the set of
discovery requests that they had served 30 days earlier.

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THE COURT: What I'm trying to find out is how much time has SCO had to review the submissions that do not allow them -- and, Mr. James, you answer this -- that doesn't allow you to narrow the issues today? So he can answer that if you don't know, Mr. Shaughnessy.

MR. SHAUGHNESSY: Okay. And all I can say on that particular subject is that the document productions that were going on in the month of January were document productions that were responsive to, you know, document requests that they had just served. We were also -- and they understood this because we had a lot of discussions about it. We were also supplementing our prior discovery, as we are required to do. So we were in the process of supplementing our prior discovery and producing that information to them. And in addition, we produced to them these financial documents, this financial information.

So the problem, Your Honor, is that I find out last night at 7 o'clock for the first time about these four databases that they contend should have been produced, which

I've never heard about before, which is not in a brief before you, which we've not had an opportunity to address, for which there's been no meet and confer. And the argument really is ironic because I don't hear and have not heard SCO argue even in the papers that they filed and in Mr. James' comments today, I don't hear SCO arguing to you that, we don't have information that we need to prove our claims. They don't argue that in the brief that they filed about, you know, we need this information. They don't say, we need this information because we can't prove damages, or, you haven't adequately told us what your revenues and expenses and profits and all of those things are.

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We certainly and clearly have done that, Your Honor. We have given them that information in excruciating detail in documents, in summaries, in indices, in witnesses, in every way imaginable that I can think of. SCO is instead arguing that they simply want more. They simply want more documents. They want more databases. They want us to produce documents from these databases.

I mean, Mr. James did not mention during his argument this issue of transaction level data, which occupied so much of their brief. I'm assuming based on his failure to discuss that today that SCO is not asking us to produce transaction level data. If that's not the case, Your Honor, then we need to discuss that, because the reality is, as I

think my affidavit explains, and I won't go through it again, but the reality is producing that transaction level data would present a problem of enormous magnitude in this case. I can't, Your Honor, even tell you how long that would take.

THE COURT: Well, I've noticed how long it took to address it in the brief, so I think I understand on some level the magnitude.

MR. SHAUGHNESSY: The magnitude is huge. Mr. James has not addressed it, so I'm assuming that issue is off the table.

The point, Your Honor, is we have given them the information that they've asked for. We've given it to them. We made it simple for them. We've given them witnesses to help explain the information. And I am at a loss as to why we're here this close to the end of the case with SCO saying, we really haven't had enough time to look at it. We really don't know what we want.

It would appear, Your Honor, that this motion to compel was filed simply as a place over. They filed a motion to compel. They included a whole bunch of broad categories, and then they were going to decide at some point down the line what it is that supposedly hadn't been produced.

And what I'm hearing today suggests to me that is exactly what is going on. What they want to do is have this motion to compel hanging out there as a place holder so that

they can come back to you at some point in time and ask you to fish through, to order us to produce something so that they can fish and get more information.

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I think if you're going to bring a motion to compel, you bring a motion to compel because you are able to identify information that has not been produced. And you respond to it, and the information is either produced or not produced. I don't think you float a motion to compel out there as a place over so that you can later on raise various challenges to it.

I understood that Mr. James and SCO were abandoning most of the other topics that were the subject of the motion to compel. He talked about Project Monterey materials. We have informed SCO that we have produced documents concerning the process, procedures and guidelines for making a GA and PRPQ release of a product, which is what they asked for. That's what we produced to them. And SCO in its reply memorandum concedes that with that representation, the motion is over with respect to that issue. On that basis, I'm assuming that issue is dead.

They asked about pre-2001 Linux marketing materials. Mr. James briefly mentioned that. In our view, Your Honor, documents before 2001 are totally irrelevant. Documents after 2001 on this particular subject are irrelevant. Nevertheless, we have conducted a reasonable

search for Linux marketing materials. We have produced thousands of pages of materials, and we have produced documents that predate 2001. And we know that SCO has them because they have used them in depositions. They have marked them as exhibits in depositions and asked witnesses questions about them. So they have the information. In our view, that is a dead issue.

Pre-1991 AIX source code. I want to make sure I answer all of the Court's questions in this regard to the extent I am able to do so.

THE COURT: And I'm basing that question on the previous order which required IBM without limit to provide it.

MR. SHAUGHNESSY: They do, Your Honor. And without getting into too much detail, if I can summarize for you what we've done.

We have produced to SCO the CMVC database and the equivalent RCF database, which is the database for the Dynix operating system. That endeavor, as I think I have explained in an affidavit I filed with the Court, involved 400 employees and 4,000 hours of work. That database goes back to 1991. The database does not go back further than that. That's when the database begins. We have made an exceedingly reasonable and thorough search for pre-1991 source code to see if it exists anywhere.

SCO has asked for a 30(b)6 witness to testify on

this subject. She has had her deposition taken. SCO has been able to ask her every question they could think of about pre-1991 source code, where it could possibly be. We've made an effort to look for it.

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Your Honor, you need to understand that by the time this lawsuit was filed in 2003, this source code had been obsolete for more than a decade. This was not information that IBM, and certainly SCO has never suggested that there is any standard, any rule, any regulation, anything that required IBM to keep decades of old obsolete material lying around somewhere.

Now, I received a letter from Mr. Normand on this subject. Mr. Normand told me, has IBM checked these data recovery centers located in various parts of the country? In response to that letter, we checked. We looked into these data centers. These data centers don't really keep IBM data. They tend to keep customer data, and they don't keep source data, but we checked. We did what they asked. We went out and looked.

THE COURT: Is that North Carolina?

MR. SHAUGHNESSY: No. The North Carolina is a different issue.

But we checked these data recovery centers. We told them what we found. We gave them a detailed explanation of what these recovery centers are, why they don't have any

information, why we weren't able to find it.

And during the deposition of Ms. Thomas,

Joan Thomas, who was the witness on the issue of pre-1991

source code, she testified at length about all the work she
had done to try to find, all the people she talked to,

everyone she'd gone to, people who were involved in the

project, everyone she could think of that may have an idea of
where this information is, was unable to find anything.

There was a period of time when the AIX source code was stored on a mainframe computer in Austin. And as I recall, Your Honor, don't hold me to this that closely because I wasn't actually at her deposition, but my recollection is that during her deposition she testified that she was aware that one of the mainframes or computers or some of the mainframe computers that could possibly have at one time had AIX source code on it had been moved from Austin to Raleigh, North Carolina; the actual hardware, the iron had been moved from Austin to Raleigh, North Carolina. She testified in her deposition, I believe, that she had no idea whether the AIX source code was on those machines at the time that they were moved. She simply knew that those machines had been moved.

SCO raised this issue. Have you looked in

North Carolina? We have. We have attempted to determine, my

understanding, our best estimate -- our best understanding is

that the AIX source code was removed from those mainframes and

put on other computers before those mainframes were ever moved to Raleigh, North Carolina. But even if it had been on those mainframes when they were moved to Raleigh, North Carolina, the actual disk drives, the disks that the material would have been on would by now be basically obsolete and unusable. So that even if they had been on them and they had been transferred, there simply is no plausible reason to believe that they would still be there.

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Now, you know, can I stand here and tell you that IBM has checked every single computer of every single employee in every closet in every single IBM location in 160 countries in the world, all 320,000 people? No, I can't. We haven't. We're not required to do that. We have done more than what is required to rule out the possibility that this pre-1991 source code may be somewhere.

Does the Court have questions about that? Is there anything I can help you with on that subject?

THE COURT: No. Thank you, Mr. Shaughnessy.

MR. SHAUGHNESSY: All I can say, Your Honor, is we have tried very, very hard to make sure that we have followed up on issues, issues we think are kind of crazy, but they raised these issues. We followed them up. We give them the information. We tell them what we found. And in this case, we followed up. We have not been able to find something that was 10 years obsolete before this lawsuit was ever even filed.

argument, the only 30(b)6 -- strike that. He is raising issues with respect to 30(b)6 topics. Let me deal first with this Chicago meeting that Mr. James references. He said a whole bunch of things about the Chicago meeting. And again, I apologize, because this is a conversation I had with Mr. Normand to which Mr. James was not a party, yesterday. Mr. Normand told me yesterday that if this July 7 meeting about which IBM's witness testified was the only meeting that occurred, then in his view, there was nothing further to pursue, and this motion was a dead letter. That's what he told me yesterday.

I've gone back. I've checked Ms. Smith's deposition. I've got a copy of it here. She testified in her deposition that this was the meeting, this was the only meeting with this particular group of people on this particular subject. So that the Court understands the context here, SCO has somehow got in its mind that these people all got together with the idea that they were going to meet and talk about SCO.

What Ms. Smith testified to is, yeah, these people got together. SCO never came up. No one ever mentioned SCO, and they never got together again.

They've had a 30(b)6 witness testify on the subject. They've asked her questions. Your Honor, when the

lawyer who was asking those questions, after she had gone through everything that Karen Smith could possibly have testified about with respect to this meeting including whether there were follow-up meetings, she concluded by saying, that's all the questions I have. She didn't say, as Mr. James says now, look, I'm reserving my right to bring you back because I think you've improperly interpreted the context, or, I think you have not answered questions you should have answered.

None of those kinds of questions. She concluded her examination at the deposition, and she said, that's it. I'm done.

Mr. Normand told me yesterday that if there was not a follow-up meeting to this July 7 meeting, this was not an issue. This is a dead letter. It is over with. There was nothing, Your Honor. There is nothing to talk about with respect to this issue.

Finally, Your Honor, this issue of interpreting AIX licenses and putting up 30(b)6 witnesses to talk about AIX licenses. Now, just so that the Court is clear on this, what SCO would like IBM to do is to put up a witness to talk about IBM's AIX license agreements with companies other than SCO, license agreements that don't have anything to do with the claims -- license agreements that are not part of this case. There's no claim in the case that relates to any of these license agreements.

But the problem, Your Honor, is broader than that, because they don't tell us what contracts they're talking about. They don't identify for us, we want you to put up a witness to talk about this contract with this date with this company. I mean, we can't even begin -- I don't even know how we could even begin to designate a witness to talk about a contract that SCO hasn't even bothered to tell us what it is. Beyond that, Your Honor, they haven't bothered to tell us what provision in what contract they're interested in having someone talk about.

It is impossible, Your Honor, for us to identify and to prepare a witness to talk about something on such a vague and morphias topic. Rule 30(b)6 requires a party to describe with reasonable particularity what it is the witness is required to testify to. They haven't done that. But more importantly, Your Honor, this is not, the testimony that they seek in this context is not a proper subject of Rule 30(b)6 testimony, and SCO has conceded that earlier in this case.

asking IBM to designate a witness to testify about the contracts that are at issue in this case, not these unrelated contracts, but actually the contracts that are at issue in this case. We objected. We said, that's not an appropriate 30(b)6 topic. If you want to take the depositions of the people who signed those contracts or negotiated those

contracts, you can do that. But you can't take a 30(b)6 deposition on the company's interpretation of a contract.

We raised the objection, and what did SCO do? They abandoned the topic. They did not further pursue it. They haven't further pursued it since that time.

Your Honor, I fail to understand how SCO could possibly say that we should be required to put up a 30(b)6 witness to talk about contracts that are not at issue in this case and that have nothing to do with this case when they have not required us to put up a 30(b)6 witness to talk about the contracts that are at issue in this case. It's not a subject that's appropriate for 30(b)6 testimony.

Now, let me just look and make sure that I've answered, I've answered your questions.

With respect to producing documents, I believe that parties are required to produce documents before they rely on them at summary judgment or at trial. That runs both ways.

Parties can't come up -- parties can't intentionally withhold a document and then suddenly parade it up and say, here you go. We win.

We have absolutely no intention of doing that. We assume that SCO has no intention of doing that. They're bound by the same standards.

The only other item that you mentioned, Judge, that I want to make sure we address and Mr. James didn't, but you

talked about this list of customers who moved from Linux to other operating systems. I don't know if that's an issue still. Mr. James hasn't talked about it.

The short answer to that, Your Honor, is that IBM does not systematically maintain that kind of information. We don't systematically maintain information that says, okay, this customer bought this particular product. And in doing so, they move from something else. So we don't have the ability to give them a list of these customers and the products from which they moved.

So that's the short answer to that particular issue. We've given them the information that we can. They've identified customers who moved to Linux. They're welcome to call those people. They're welcome to depose those people and they can ask them. But we can't be asked to create something we don't have the data to create.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Shaughnessy.

Go ahead, Mr. James.

MR. JAMES: I'll be very brief, Your Honor. Let me just hit on a couple things, if I could.

Counsel has indicated he doesn't know why we're here, that it's unclear to him what's still at issue. And that's something we have struggled with because, Your Honor, we filed our motion. We outlined the areas that we think are

at issue. We tell you the document requests where we don't think we've had documents produced. Soon thereafter, and my understanding is the last week of January in answer to your question about when the majority of these documents were produced, we get 340,000 documents. And we're diligently going through those.

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And IBM tells us in their opposition memorandum, Your Honor, we've now produced a lot of the documents, of additional documents, and we anticipate producing even some additional documents that we haven't seen yet. And as a result, the great majority of the complaint that SCO has is mooted.

And I've tried to be candid with Your Honor, and I've indicated that may be the case. Many of the areas we believe likely are mooted. The problem that we have is we don't know yet if there are still some clear areas that aren't mooted. And we think it is a bit unfair for IBM to come in and say, hey, now we've produced all of these documents, and it is a moot issue, and you ought to just deny their motion across the board, because we're diligently looking through those documents, and if there are areas where documents that should have been produced and they haven't been, we want the right to be able to address those issues with Your Honor, and we anticipate doing so.

That's why I feel like I'm put at somewhat of a

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disadvantage when they come in and say, Gees, they can't even tell us now after all of these discussions over the last couple weeks specifically what's still at issue --

THE COURT: Let me ask you this, though. You've indicated four areas that you said they have not provided discovery. But how do you know that if you haven't gone through everything?

MR. JAMES: There are four areas we think they have not produced based on --

THE COURT: You're not even sure of that?

MR. JAMES: We're not 100-percent certain, because originally, Your Honor, when you do these huge document reviews, you try to take an initial cut and get a sense of what's there. But it is just a gross review of the documents. And then you go from that. You do your detailed review, and we're doing that. And as I indicated, my understanding is we'll complete that in a couple more weeks. And that's why it's very, very difficult for us to be able to still come in and say in response to IBM's response, it's all moot because we produced all of this stuff now, for us to say, we agree or disagree.

And we have pointed out several areas, Your Honor, where we are concerned. Now, it's an interesting thing. And I suppose maybe where I can hit the nail most closely on the head, perhaps, is to just talk for a moment about a statement

that the Honorable Magistrate Boyce frequently used in response to these type of arguments. And I heard it. It was used on my behalf, and it was used against me by him on a number of different occasions. And what he would say is, unless the burden of producing the documents requested exceeds the effort required to clean the -- and I'll slaughter the word -- the Augean stables, you know the Hercules myth, produce the documents.

THE COURT: He had a tendency for animal analogies.

MR. JAMES: He did.

And, Your Honor, what this is about is not what IBM has done, and they stood up and told you everything they've done and we could stand up and tell you everything we've done. The issue is, are there relevant documents in this case within IBM's possession and control that we've requested that they haven't produced? That's what we're trying to get at.

There is no point that I'm aware of in discovery where you say, well, we may have another 10,000 documents that are relevant that we can produce to you reasonably. But because we've already given you a whole bunch, we don't need to give those to you. And, Your Honor, that is what I think I'm hearing.

Your Honor asked the question, with respect to the pre-1991 AIX versions. Can you submit or sign an affidavit that says you've made your searches, and it doesn't exist as

far as you can tell?

You know what, if they'll just provide that affidavit, we're happy. That's all -- all they can do is what they can do. But telling you what they've done doesn't answer the question about what they haven't done.

And on the Chicago 7 -- and, Your Honor, I'm sensitive to Your Honor's comments about knowing what counsel has discussed, and I apologize for not knowing exactly the content of the conversation that apparently occurred yesterday.

My understanding with respect to the Chicago 7 issue is, again, our request went to, we want to know what discussions have occurred among that group relating to Linux-related activities, AIX-related activities, SCO and a couple other things.

THE COURT: But when you had the opportunity to address that during the deposition, it apparently was not addressed.

MR. JAMES: No. My understanding was different.

Maybe I misunderstood what Mr. Shaughnessy said. What I understood him to say, and, in fact, what my understanding is when it was attempted to be addressed during the deposition, that line of questioning was cut off with an objection, we're not going to allow the witness to answer those questions. And then at the end of the deposition, the lawyer for SCO asking

the questions did not say, we want to come back and reserve this and keep it open. And I view that as two very different issues, Your Honor.

MR. JAMES: Let me lastly say, and then I'll sit

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THE COURT: All right.

down, that the standard that governs obviously in this case is Rule 26, and that is, do they have documents that are relevant

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or may lead to the discovery of additional relevant documents? We're concerned about some areas. But because of what I've

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talked about at length before, I can't answer that question

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entirely, other than the areas I've hit. And I don't know

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what more I can say about that.

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something that they say they've already provided but you don't

THE COURT: How can I order them to provide

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know if they've provided?

of documents that they provide.

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MR. JAMES: Well, and that's the point, Your Honor. Your Honor indicated at the start, and when I started, are we

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going to be back here in some period of time to address

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anything that's still out there? And my response was, in

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fact, we probably should in light of the very late production

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THE COURT: Wasn't that, as Mr. Shaughnessy said,

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didn't that comport with your timeline for request of those documents?

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MR. JAMES: No, Your Honor. And the reason I say

that is because if you look at our motion to compel and look at the document request that are at issue, many of those document requests date back to 2004. And they didn't produce those documents until the last week of January in this case. And then they come in and say, hey, we've now produced all of these documents. It's moot. Accept our representation.

THE COURT: Let's address this issue that is of some concern to me, and that is that your motion to compel is dated December 29, before the due date of some of those documents. How do you address Mr. Shaughnessy's argument that this motion was intended as a place over?

MR. JAMES: Because my response is when you look at the documents that we complain about in our motion to compel, those documents or those requests, areas where we specified our motion address document requests, not that we're served two or three days later, but were served months and maybe over -- well over a year before the motion to compel was filed.

If Your Honor has any other questions, I'll do my best to answer them.

THE COURT: I do not. What I would intend to do now, Mr. Shaughnessy, unless you have something in particular you want to address, is I'm going to take a recess and decide how to address these issues. Do you have anything you want to say?

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MR. SHAUGHNESSY: That's fine, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. We'll be in recess for a few moments. And let's see if Judge Kimball has gone home or we need to go somewhere else.

(Recess.)

THE COURT: I'm going to rule now on the motion to compel.

And I'm going to deny SCO's motion to compel at this time. I'm going to deny that without prejudice. And I'm going to allow you 30 days in which to file a renewed motion. Should you file such a renewed motion, however, it must clearly and narrowly define those areas which are not addressed in the documents that you've been presented and which cannot be resolved through some additional meet-and-confer requirements. All right?

MR. SHAUGHNESSY: So then will the motion then be limited to this production in January and the deficiencies --THE COURT: Yes. Yes.

Are there any other questions that need to be posed or should be posed and answers given, or is that clear?

MR. SHAUGHNESSY: I think that's clear. Would you like me to prepare an order on that, as well?

> THE COURT: Yes. Yes.

MR. JAMES: I'm sorry, Your Honor. If you don't mind, I want to make sure that I'm absolutely clear because I

1 don't want to have any quarreling, I suppose, with opposing 2 counsel about issues that may come up as far as relating to 3 the January production. And that is, there are a number of 4 issues that we have already identified in our motion but that 5 I wasn't able to clearly articulate whether they're satisfied 6 or not because I haven't been able to -- you know, we haven't 7 completed our review. We'll be able to raise those issues, 8 won't we, if we can narrowly address them? 9 THE COURT: Yes. 10 MR. JAMES: Okay. Thank you. 11 THE COURT: Is that understood? 12 MR. SHAUGHNESSY: So then it's whatever items that 13 are in the motion, the currently pending motion, if any? THE COURT: Yes. 14 15 MR. SHAUGHNESSY: And then deficiencies in the January production? 16 17 MR. JAMES: That's my understanding. 18 THE COURT: Yes. And that's what I intended. 19 MR. SHAUGHNESSY: And I expect the Court would 20 require the parties to meet and confer, obviously before that motion is filed. 21 22 THE COURT: Yes. I'm going to require that. 23 All right. Is there anything further we need to 24 address this afternoon?

Thank you, counsel. We'll be in recess.

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1	MR. JAMES: Thank you, Your Honor.
2	MR. SHAUGHNESSY: Thank you, Your Honor.
3	(Whereupon, the court proceedings were concluded.)
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]	1	STATE OF UTAH)
7	2) ss.
ل	. 3	COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
1	4	I, KELLY BROWN HICKEN, do hereby certify that I am
	5	a certified court reporter for the State of Utah;
]	6	That as such reporter, I attended the hearing of
7	7	the foregoing matter on March 7, 2005, and thereat reported in
	8	Stenotype all of the testimony and proceedings had, and caused
	. 9	said notes to be transcribed into typewriting; and the
7	10	foregoing pages number from 1 through 42 constitute a full,
	11	true and correct report of the same.
]	12	That I am not of kin to any of the parties and have
7	13	no interest in the outcome of the matter;
.j	14	And hereby set my hand and seal, this 17 day of
	15	Mrsh 2005
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	20	KELLY BROWN HICKEN, CSR, RPR, RMR
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